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CANALS, COMMUNITY, AND COASTAL PERMITS:
OVERCOMING INADEQUATE REMEDIES FOR EROSION
WITHIN THE BARATARIA-TERREBONNE
NATIONAL ESTUARY
ABSTRACT
The Barataria-Terrebonne National Estuary has lost over 934 square miles
of land since 1932, causing a mass exodus of communities within the estuary,
including the Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw tribe of Isle de Jean Charles. Though
some of this erosion can be attributed to rising sea levels and natural
subsidence, scientists now realize that the majority of this loss has been caused
by human development. Specifically, navigation and pipeline canals dredged by
the oil and natural gas industry are alleged to be responsible for as much as
89% of all land lost within Louisiana before 1983. This ongoing land loss has
led to numerous attempts to hold developers liable for the damage, but the
Louisiana Code does not support non-adjacent erosion claims under theories of
tortious nuisance, nor can plaintiffs succeed as third-party beneficiaries from
the licenses and permits issued to developers. Federal coastal legislation—
sometimes used as a last resort—is similarly ineffective in land loss suits by
individual litigants.
Though some recent federal decisions would support a Fifth Amendment
takings claim for non-adjacent erosion to the extent that causation could be
proven, myriad hurdles stand in the way. A six-year statute of limitations on
takings claims would prevent most successful claims, and the 10,000-mile
network of canals in Louisiana would preclude practical causation
determinations. Worse, the damages would be limited to the land actually taken:
a few feet of property in most instances. Further, compensating a landowner for
eroding shoreline does nothing to mitigate future erosion, nor does it combat
the threat that sea level rise might claim these coastal communities even before
the land erodes from beneath them.
Coastal communities suffering from land loss frequently condition coastal
development permits on impact fees that go to wetlands restoration funds. This
Comment proposes that these coastal impact fees be drastically elevated to
include mandatory contributions to a relocation fund for refugees of coastal
land loss. Such a fund would be an adequate remedy for those unable to undergo
the extensive causation burdens of viable takings claims and for whom claims in
tortious nuisance and contract can provide no relief. Most importantly, it would
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place the cost of relocation on those accountable—oil and natural gas
companies—instead of taxpayers.
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INTRODUCTION
This Comment begins where the life of its author began: the BaratariaTerrebonne National Estuary (BTNE). Stretched between the Mississippi and
Atchafalaya rivers in South Louisiana, the BTNE encompasses 4.2 million acres
covering all or parts of sixteen parishes.1 To advocates of America’s wetlands,
the BTNE is a paradise for ecological diversity, a treasure trove of natural
resources, and a refuge for diverse cultures and indigenous tribes.2 Though long
famous for its recreation and tales of the pirate Jean Lafitte,3 the BTNE achieved
national significance in 1990, when Congress created the Barataria-Terrebonne
National Estuary Program (BTNEP) as part of the National Estuary Program.4
Though BTNEP and similar organizations serve as environmental stewards
and engineers of restoration, their efforts are not enough. For every acre that
Louisiana reclaims, many more are lost to the tide.5 Estimates fluctuate, with
one Supreme Court opinion stating that natural environmental factors such as
“[s]oil compaction, sea level rise and recurrent storms are destroying
approximately [twenty to thirty] square miles of Louisiana wetlands each year.”6
To counteract Louisiana’s massive loss of wetlands, “the state would have to
churn out a hundred and eighty-six acres every nine days,”7 but these results and
their land-loss predicates vary widely parish-to-parish and basin-to-basin,8
requiring nuanced and particularized solutions. For example, the Terrebonne

1
Louisiana uses the term “parish,” not county. These parishes include Ascension, Assumption, Iberia,
Iberville, Jefferson, Lafourche, Orleans, Plaquemines, Pointe Coupee, St. Charles, St. James, St. John the
Baptist, St. Martin, St. Mary, Terrebonne, and West Baton Rouge. What is BTNEP?, BARATARIA-TERREBONNE
NAT’L ESTUARY PROGRAM, https://btnep.org/about-btnep/what-is-btnep/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2020). See
generally National Estuary Program Study Areas, ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/
files/2020-04/documents/nep_national_map_2020.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2020) (map of national estuary
programs in the United States).
2
Elizabeth Kolbert, Louisiana’s Disappearing Coast, NEW YORKER (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.
newyorker.com/magazine/2019/04/01/louisianas-disappearing-coast.
3
Id.
4
Overview of the National Estuary Program, ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/nep/
overview-national-estuary-program (last visited Dec. 16, 2020) (“The National Estuary Program (NEP) is an
Environmental Protection Agency place-based program to protect and restore the water quality and ecological
integrity of estuaries of national significance. Currently, 28 estuaries located along the Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific
coasts and in Puerto Rico are designated as estuaries of national significance.”).
5
Kolbert, supra note 2.
6
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 522 n.18 (2006).
7
Kolbert, supra note 2.
8
See Coastal Louisiana Basins, COASTAL WETLANDS PLANNING, PROT. & RESTORATION ACT,
https://lacoast.gov/new/About/Basins.aspx (last visited Dec. 16, 2020) (describing in depth each of Louisiana’s
basins’ fresh water, sediment, shape, erosion, and ecology).
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Basin lost more than 30,000 acres of wetlands from 1932 to 2016, whereas the
Atchafalaya Basin gained 4,000 acres of wetlands in the same time frame.9
Land loss fluctuations are often the result of innumerable complex factors,
such as natural erosive processes, tropical storms, hurricanes,10 canal dredging,
and even nutria.11 Levees along the lower Mississippi River also prevent the
perennial flooding that had once carried sediment necessary for soil accretion
and land growth.12 Though “land formed by river sediments naturally subsides
and sinks over time as part of the delta cycle,”13 this veritable straight-jacketing14
of the Mississippi Delta has resulted in dramatically increased, unnatural
subsidence due to the “elimination of riverine input to most of the coastal
zone.”15 Laudable attempts at rebuilding the Terrebonne Basin are projected to
9
Alisha Renfro, A Tale of Two Basins: Why One Is Thriving While the Other Is Dying, RESTORE MISS.
RIVER DELTA: DELTA DISPATCHES (May 7, 2018), http://mississippiriverdelta.org/a-tale-of-two-basins-whyone-is-thriving-while-the-other-is-dying/. The difference between the Atchafalaya Basin and the Terrebonne
Basin can best be explained through sediment deficiency: “[t]he key to successful, ongoing land-building in the
Atchafalaya Basin is the steady flow of sediment” form the area’s receipt of, “on average, 30 percent of the
combined flow of the Mississippi and Red Rivers.” Id. These water inflows carry with them a “constant stream
of sediment into the broad, shallow Atchafalaya Basin [that] has resulted in this being the only basin in Louisiana
to experience net land gain.” Id. The Terrebonne Basin, on the other hand, has faced an unprecedented
“disintegration of [its] productive and protective wetlands” due to its poor sedimentation and freshwater inflows,
“leaving coastal communities, industry and vital infrastructure increasingly vulnerable to storms.” Id.
10
Doug Herman, Prospects Are Looking Up for this Gulf Coast Tribe Relocating to Higher Ground,
SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Aug. 9, 2018), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/prospects-arelooking-gulf-coast-tribe-relocating-higher-ground-180969932/. In an interview completed as part of
Smithsonian’s “Recovering Voices” series, Deputy Chief Wenceslaus Billiot, Jr. of the Biloxi-ChitimachaChoctaw tribe of Isle de Jean Charles discussed the potential for storm impacts:

[I]f there’s a hurricane in Texas, we get seven or eight feet of water here. There’s no more land,
no buffers, no barrier islands to stop the surge. Not just from the canal digging, but hurricanes,
and subsidence. And sea level rise. There are some docks that in the 1970s were two feet above
the water. Now they’re under water and they had to build a new dock above it.
Id.
11
Heidi Beck, Why Is Louisiana Losing Land?, NICHOLAS SCH. INTERNSHIP BLOGS (July 7, 2011),
https://blogs.nicholas.duke.edu/internshipblogs/why-is-louisiana-losing-land/. Nutria, known locally as “swamp
rats,” are “large semi-aquatic rodents indigenous to South America.” Nutria, NUTRIA.COM, https://www.nutria.
com/site.php (last visited Dec. 16, 2020).
12
Ted Jackson, On the Louisiana Coast, A Native Community Sinks Slowly into the Sea, YALE ENV’T 360
(Mar. 15, 2018), https://e360.yale.edu/features/on-louisiana-coast-a-native-community-sinks-slowly-into-thesea-isle-de-jean-charles.
13
Causes of Land Loss, RESTORE MISS RIVER DELTA: LAND LOSS, http://mississippiriverdelta.org/ourcoastal-crisis/land-loss/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2020) (emphasis added).
14
Levees located in the delta, combined with “valuable land-building sediment [being] trapped behind
locks and dams on the Missouri, Mississippi and Ohio Rivers,” have led to a 70% decrease in “the amount of
sediment in the Lower Mississippi River.” Id.
15
John W. Day, Jr., Louis D. Britsch, Suzanne R. Hawes, Gary P. Shaffer, Denise J. Reed & Donald
Cahoon, Pattern and Process of Land Loss in the Mississippi Delta: A Spatial and Temporal Analysis of Wetland
Habitat Change, 23 ESTUARIES 425, 426 (2000). The Mississippi River Mid-Basin Sediment Diversion Program
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take years to complete and decades to effectuate significant results, leaving little
recourse for the communities whose land is disappearing beneath their feet,16
particularly the residents of Isle de Jean Charles.
In 2016, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development granted
Louisiana $48.3 million in Community Development Block Grant funds to help
resettle the tightly knit community on Isle de Jean Charles.17 Inhabited since the
early 1800s, the Island is a coastal fishing village resting deep in the BTNE,
nearly sixty miles southwest of New Orleans.18 In the 1950s, the Island
encompassed 22,400 acres.19 It now sits at a paltry 320 acres,20 each day
shrinking to the relentless tide. In fact, “the surrounding wetlands are so
compromised that even a strong south wind combined with a high tide will flood
the only roadway linking the [I]sland to civilization,”21 the neighboring fishing
village of Pointe-aux-Chênes, where many of the Island’s descendants now
reside.22
has been laid out to address this problem, attempting to “reconnect the [Mississippi] River and restore the natural
processes that initially built the delta.” Mississippi River Mid-Basin Sediment Diversion Program, COASTAL
PROT. & RESTORATION AUTH., https://coastal.la.gov/our-work/key-initiatives/diversion-program/aboutsediment-diversions/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2020).
16
John Carey, Louisiana Wetlands Tattered by Industrial Canals, Not Just River Levees, SCI. AM. (Dec.
1, 2013), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/carey-louisiana-wetlands-tattered-by-industrial-canals/.
The Mississippi River Mid-Basin Sediment Diversion Program is a part of Louisiana’s 2012 Coastal Master
Plan, which has the overarching goal of “rebuild[ing] the state’s vanishing coastal wetlands [by] cutting gaps in
the levees, diverting water and sediment so that the land-building material flows again across parts of the
landscape.” Id.
17
The Story of Isle de Jean Charles, ISLE DE JEAN CHARLES RESETTLEMENT, http://isledejeancharles.la.
gov/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2020). Within Terrebonne Parish and coastal Louisiana, one rarely hears the full name
“Isle de Jean Charles.” Instead, residents have condensed its name to merely “the Island,” corresponding to the
only way to drive there: the “Island Road.” Id.
18
Kolbert, supra note 2.
19
Emilee Martichenko, Climate Refugees: Louisiana Tribe Fights for Sovereignty over Resettlement as
Island Disappears, CULTURAL SURVIVAL (Mar. 29, 2019), https://www.culturalsurvival.org/news/climaterefugees-louisiana-tribe-fights-sovereignty-over-resettlement-island-disappears.
20
Jackson, supra note 12.
21
Id.
22
Already in a precarious condition, the fate of Isle de Jean Charles was sealed in 1998, when the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers decided not to extend the Morganza-to-the-Gulf Flood Protection System to
encompass the Island, ostensibly because “building the extension would have added a hundred million dollars
to the project’s [$10 billion] price tag and preserved just three hundred soupy acres.” Kolbert, supra note 2. In
similarly affected coastal communities, such as those in North Carolina and Alaska, residents “have struggled
to secure assistance . . . because there is no bureaucratic framework for relocation” and because inertia has set
in from “inherently uncertain” climate-change forecasts. Michelle Nijhuis, When Is It Time to Retreat from
Climate Change?, NEW YORKER (Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-technology/
when-is-it-time-to-retreat-from-climate-change. Residents of Isle de Jean Charles, however, have benefitted
from bureaucracy, working with the Louisiana Office of Community Development so that this community can
be moved to Schriever, Louisiana, twelve feet above sea level and nearly an hour north of Isle de Jean Charles.
Jackson, supra note 12.
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However, the narrative regarding sediment deficiency’s role in land loss is
rapidly changing. Recent scholarship has established that the 10,000-mile
network of navigation and pipeline canals, constructed primarily for the oil and
natural gas industry, has played a significantly larger role in land loss than
previously indicated, with one study alleging that industrial canals are
responsible for as much as 89% of all land lost in Louisiana prior to 1983.23 This
Comment shows that there are no adequate, existing remedies at law to address
such massive land loss stemming from industrial canals, and land loss victims
would benefit from a legislative solution in the form of a coastal impact feebased relocation fund.
Part I of this Comment examines the history of navigation and pipeline
canals in coastal Louisiana, specifically within the Barataria-Terrebonne
National Estuary. It lays out how canals proliferated throughout the coast
without regulation, eventually becoming a network of 10,000 miles, shredding
estuaries and causing the mass exodus of coastal communities, such as the
Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw tribe of Isle de Jean Charles. Part II of this
Comment analyzes the inadequacies in three different remedies at law: tortious
nuisance, a theory of third-party beneficiaries from licenses and permits issued
to developers, and citizen suits under the Clean Water Act (CWA). Part III
argues that litigation following Banks v. United States would support a
successful Fifth Amendment taking claim in the context of canal-induced
erosion to the extent that causation can be proven. It then argues that the
expenses of proving causation and the statute of limitations under the Tucker
Act, though not preclusive to victory in Banks, would effectively prevent
individual coastal litigants from pursuing such a claim in the BTNE. Last, Part
IV argues that coastal legislatures should modify their respective coastal impact
fee programs for the development of relocation programs for victims of canalinduced land loss. Such an impact fee system would hold developers accountable
for their prior conduct while also providing the only adequate remedy for the
victims of coastal land loss: relocation.
I.

CANALS AND LAND LOSS: HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

With a vanishing coast and cultures on the run, many have wondered who,
or what, is to blame. Could it be Mother Nature, humbling us with her heavy and
unpredictable hand? There is no doubt that natural events, such as hurricanes
and tropical storms, have ravaged the Gulf Coast, causing “elevated sea level,
23
Oliver A. Houck, The Reckoning: Oil and Gas Development in the Louisiana Coastal Zone, 28 TUL.
ENV’T L.J. 185, 205–06 nn.89–90 (2015); see infra note 49 and accompanying text.
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known as storm surge, and extensive shoreline erosion and other geologic effects
leading to the loss of property and life.”24 Another contributing factor is the
dreaded nutria rat, an herbivorous rodent that “eat[s] the roots and tubers of
marsh plants,” furthering erosion because “land-building sediment is more
easily eroded without plants present.”25 However, the blame levied toward
nature should be reserved, lest Louisianans ignore the perennial soil accretion
thwarted by the leveeing of the lower Mississippi River26 and their own
culpability in bringing the nutria to Louisiana in furtherance of the fur industry.27
Beyond levees and nutria, significant scholarship has focused on other
human elements driving coastal land loss, with many commentators treating Isle
de Jean Charles as a case study for the health of the Gulf Coast as a whole,28 and
some suggesting that such human catastrophes should compel a reevaluation of
the takings doctrine regarding coastal erosion.29 Though this scholarship has laid
out in great detail the various environmental traumas afflicting South Louisiana,
there has not been enough traction regarding the adequate remediation of this
trauma.
Even with the grants already given to Isle de Jean Charles, there is still much
work to be done in rebuilding a community that has already been torn apart.
Furthermore, this relief is intended only to alleviate the effects of the underlying
problem. Both the State of Louisiana and the federal government have chosen
to pay away the symptoms instead of treating the causes of this disease, which
has threatened not only one of Louisiana’s most vibrant and distinct cultures,
but also the ecosystem that had sustained this culture for the last 170 years30 and

24
Abby Sallenger, Hurricane Impacts on the Coastal Environment, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV.: COASTAL
& MARINE GEOLOGY PROGRAM, https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/hurricane-impacts/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2020).
25
Beck, supra note 11.
26
Jackson, supra note 12.
27
Beck, supra note 11.
28
See Alexander B. Lemann, Stronger Than the Storm: Disaster Law in a Defiant Age, 78 LA. L. REV.
437, 490–92 (2018); Joseph Rosenberg, Condemn (The) Nation: Holding the United States Accountable Through
Inverse Condemnation Claims for Its Role in Bringing About—and Then Failing to Mitigate and Adapt to
Certain Effects of—Climate Change, 26 BUFF. ENV’T L.J. 85, 88 (2019); Morgan E. Ducote, Comment, Uprooted
and Underwater: An Examination of the Ideology Towards the Legal Implications of Coastal Erosion, 45 S.U.
L. REV. 187, 191 (2017); Lauren Zanolli, Louisiana’s Vanishing Island: The Climate ‘Refugees’ Resettling for
$52m, GUARDIAN (Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/mar/15/louisiana-isle-dejean-charles-island-sea-level-resettlement.
29
Rosenberg, supra note 28, at 89, 133; Clinton W. Shinn, Of Coase, the Takings Clause, and the
Inexorably Shrinking Marsh: A Review with Lagniappe, 29 S.U. L. REV. 271, 279, 285–87 (2002); Bud Davis,
Strengthening the Floodwalls: Reinterpreting the Federal Circuit’s Ridge Line Test to Limit Government
Liability in Takings Jurisprudence, 26 FED. CIR. BAR J. 29, 31–33 (2016); Ducote, supra note 28, at 191, 210–
11.
30
Herman, supra note 10.
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Native Americans since approximately 1000 C.E.31 Such a mass exodus has
been of particular interest to legal scholars,32 who are left scratching their heads
wondering whether the stripping of earth from beneath coastal residents’ feet
also signals an equally dubious loss in property rights. This Part first overviews
the vast network of canals within the BTNE before discussing their origins and
direct relationship with coastal land loss.
A. Overview of Navigation and Pipeline Canals in the Barataria-Terrebonne
National Estuary
One need only perform a cursory internet search of Isle de Jean Charles
before being inundated with images of water and loss.33 In stark contrast to the
jagged coastlines and dilapidated housing dotting this island, however, are the
sharp lines of clearly delineated navigation and pipeline canals used for the
exploration and acquisition of oil and natural gas in Louisiana’s marshlands.34
Canal dredging for these purposes has been common since the early twentieth
century, picking up in the late 1940s, yet there was minimal federal oversight
until implementation of coastal legislation in the 1970s.35 Only recently has
scholarship attempted to shed light on the effects that these canals have had on
the disappearance of Louisiana’s wetlands, specifically through erosion.36
The collapse of land density in and around Isle de Jean Charles is caused by
innumerable factors, none of which can be taken in isolation. Each cause of
environmental degradation exacerbates the effects of other causes.37 For
example, erosion can contribute to subsidence and vice versa. Whereas Isle de
Jean Charles is undoubtedly sinking due to subsidence,38 the lower, decreased
31
Naomi King, Cemetery, Sacred Mound Receive State Marker, HOUMA TODAY (Nov. 17, 2007, 12:25
AM), https://www.houmatoday.com/news/20071117/cemetery-sacred-mound-receive-state-marker.
32
See infra Part III.C.
33
Images of Isle de Jean Charles, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com (follow “Images” hyperlink; then
search “Isle de Jean Charles”).
34
Id.; see Houck, supra note 23, at 195–96 (describing the visual appearance of canals along Louisiana’s
coast from the 1920s to present day).
35
See infra Part I.D.
36
See Ricardo A. Olea & James L. Coleman, A Synoptic Examination of Causes of Land Loss in Southern
Louisiana as Related to the Exploitation of Subsurface Geologic Resources, 30 J. COASTAL RSCH. 1025, 1035–
37 (2014).
37
Day et al., supra note 15, at 426.
38
According to Bob Marshall, a New Orleans-based environmental journalist, “[e]xperts familiar with
the issues in Louisiana and other coastal areas of the U.S. would disagree” that climate change is the problem
underlying Isle de Jean Charles’ land loss. Bob Marshall, The People of Isle de Jean Charles Aren’t the Country’s
First Climate Refugees, LENS (Dec. 6, 2016), https://thelensnola.org/2016/12/06/the-people-of-isle-de-jeancharles-arent-the-countrys-first-climate-refugees/. It would be more accurate to call residents of this island
“‘America’s first subsidence refugees.’ After all, the [I]sland rests on a sediment-starved delta that is one of the
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landmass encourages more saltwater infiltration, which, in turn, can kill off the
vegetation sustaining these land-masses, thereby furthering subsidence.39 For
the residents of this island and other coastal communities, it is a never-ending
cycle of land loss perpetuating land loss.40
Though it is the totality of circumstances pervading the estuary that causes
such massive wetlands erosion, few can doubt the tremendous impact that
industrial and navigation canals have had on Louisiana’s landscape. At one point
in time, Isle de Jean Charles was accessible only by pirogues, a small canoeshaped dugout,41 before larger canals were dredged for fishing boats to
navigate.42 Following the Great Depression, “oil fields came in and started
making canals to bring in more [oil] rigs. In 1953 a road was built to access the
oil tanks. Saltwater seeped into the canals.”43 Dredging was not limited to the
areas surrounding Isle de Jean Charles, though many of its most immediate
effects were felt by the Island’s residents. Chantel Comardelle, tribal secretary
of the Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw tribe residing on Isle de Jean Charles, has
stated that “[w]hen I was growing up, it was mostly brackish water, lots of fresh
water. I was told the[re] were rice fields, but you wouldn’t know because now
it’s just water over there.”44 What was once brackish and fresh is now mostly
life-depriving saltwater rushing deeper and deeper inland from canal inflows.
It is also beyond dispute that South Louisiana’s network of canals is
interrelated, with no single canal being a determinant in the health of the system
as a whole. Recent litigation has focused specifically on this interrelationship,
as most canal networks “continue[] to introduce increasingly larger volumes of
damaging saltwater, at increasingly greater velocity, ever deeper into
Louisiana’s coastal landscape and interior wetlands.”45 What is more important

fastest-subsiding coastal landscapes on the planet.” Id. Marshall also interviewed Alex Kolker, a researcher from
the Louisiana Universities Marine Consortium, who said, “[s]ubsidence was about five times faster than global
sea level rise at Isle de Jean Charles last century, and it’s now about three times faster than global sea level rise.”
Id.
39
Marshall, supra note 38; see also Day et al., supra note 15 (describing the link between saltwater
intrusion and widespread death of marshes).
40
As Walter Williams, a filmmaker responsible for documentaries on coastal restoration, put it: “it’s not
just the over 10,000 miles of canals, it’s the trillions of barrels of oil they sucked from beneath us that collapsed
major areas of the region below sea level. It’s not rocket science. It’s mud and gravity.” Houck, supra note 23,
at 210 (citation omitted).
41
Herman, supra note 10.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Pet. for Damages and Injunctive Relief at 9, Bd. of Comm’rs of the Se. La. Flood Prot. Auth. – E. v.
Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 2013 WL 3948577 (La. Dist. Ct. 2013) (Trial Pleading).
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is that any given canal does not only further erosion of the adjacent canal banks,
but also the estuary as a whole:
Oil and gas activities continue to transform what was once a stable
ecosystem of naturally occurring bayous, small canals, and ditches into
an extensive—and expanding—network of large and deep canals that
continues to widen due to [oil companies’] ongoing failure to maintain
this network or restore the ecosystem to its natural state.46

Even scholars who reject that canals are the primary driver of coastal erosion47
admit that “hydrologic restoration, specifically with reference to canal spoil
banks, should be a necessary component of a holistic, integrated delta restoration
plan.”48 With all facets of scholarship recognizing that harm posed by canals is
interrelated as part of a larger network of devastation,49 one cannot help but
speculate upon not only the origins of these canals, but the driving factors in
their construction: blind avarice and willful ignorance toward their adverse
environmental effects.
B. Origin and Utility of Canals in the Barataria-Terrebonne National Estuary
In a particularly exhaustive article on the history of oil and gas development
on the Louisiana coast, Oliver A. Houck, environmental law professor at Tulane
University, laments the political strangleholds on challenging the oil industry
before launching his attack: following Hurricane Katrina, politicians became all
too aware that “50 miles of marshes and cypress swamps that once buffered its
levee system from Gulf storms were largely gone, shredded by oil industry
canals.”50 But how did these canals come about?

46
Id.; see also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 667–69 (2019) (detailing limitations and regulations on use of
property to prevent inconvenience to neighbors).
47
Day et al., supra note 15, at 436. In this study, the authors agree that “canals have been, and continue
to be, an important agent in contributing to this land loss.” Id. However, the authors argue that the “eliminat[ion
of] a major land building and maintenance mechanism” from the leveeing of the lower Mississippi River, which
forces “the exclusion of sediments, freshwater, and nutrients,” is the most determinant factor in coastal erosion.
Id.
48
Id.
49
Olea & Coleman, supra note 36, at 1035–37. The data implicating canals speaks largely for itself:

Rates of land loss reported by the U.S. Geological Survey . . . do show an acceleration in land
loss during a period from 1974–88, accounting for as much as an additional 1000 km² land loss
over the historical rate of about 50 km²/y before and after this period. This survey represents a
30–59% increase in land loss relative to the trend before and after 1974–88, which may be
attributed primarily to canal constructions.
Id. at 1034.
50
Houck, supra note 23, at 186.

NAQUIN_1.21.21

2021]

2/1/2021 12:20 PM

INADEQUATE REMEDIES FOR EROSION

673

The birth of the oil industry in Louisiana coincides with the discovery of an
oil field located at the Spindletop salt dome in 1901, “vault[ing] the Gulf Coast
of the United States to prominence in the world petroleum industry.”51 Less than
a decade later, John D. Rockefeller and his Standard Oil Company completed a
refinery along the banks of the Mississippi River in Baton Rouge, ushering in a
new era of industry for South Louisiana.52
In the beginning, the petroleum industry was not propagated through chance
discoveries, despite romanticized notions that “[oil] was everywhere, oil
bubbling up from seeps in the Gulf of Mexico . . . , from salt domes in the
ground, wisps of methane in the air, exploding, usually in tiny pockets, once big
enough to set an entire island on fire for several months, phenomena of
wonder.”53 In fact, “[e]xploring such environments tended to be a gradual and
incremental process, involving the adaptation of land-based equipment and
technologies to particular locations.”54 Salt domes and some inland waters55
provided particularly easy access, but the vast swaths of shallow open water,
swamps, and marshlands frustrated the purposes of oilmen.56 Many turned to
methods used by muskrat trappers, such as using pirogues in order to navigate
various trainasses, “tiny canals often carved out of the swamps and marshes by
hand with the aid of a pirogue paddle.”57
As technology developed, Gulf Oil designed a type of marsh buggy used by
geophysical crews, “propell[ing] the buggy as fast as 10 mph in the marsh and

51
DIANE AUSTIN, TYLER PRIEST, LAUREN PENNEY, JOSEPH PRATT, ALLAN J. PULSIPHER, JOSEPH ABEL &
JENNIFER TAYLOR, U.S. DEP’T. OF THE INTERIOR, GULF OF MEX. OCS REGION, OCS STUDY MMS 2008-042,
PAPERS ON THE EVOLVING OFFSHORE INDUSTRY 13 (2008).
52
Houck labels this refinery, which is still the largest in the country, as “a looming permanence behind
the state capital building,” ostensibly connecting this monolith of industry as something that not only “molded
the politics and economics of Louisiana[;] it molded the mind.” Houck, supra note 23, at 189, 192.
53
Id. at 188.
54
AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 51, at 25.
55
Id.
56
One researcher later explained the problem in terms of a cost-benefit analysis:

There were no roads in the marshes, no bridges over the bayous, no bases from which to move
out into the bays. That whole expanse from Calcasieu Lake to Breton Sound was a sort of nature’s
no-man’s land, neither land nor sea. A steamboat ran from Lake Charles to Cameron; the road
would not be built until the mid-1930s. . . . Even the largest oil companies regarded the cost of
building roads and bridges prohibitive. Transportation of personnel by boat and barge was
difficult.
Id. (quoting R.L. Lankford, Marine Drilling, in HISTORY OF OIL WELL DRILLING 1379 (J.E. Brantly ed., 1971)).
57
Id. at 26. Though early oilmen were able to carry some of their lighter equipment via these trainasses,
vegetation often prohibited larger boat traffic, requiring exploration by foot, sometimes “waist-deep in swamp
water dodging cypress roots and saw-toothed palmetto leaves” in addition to snakes and leeches. Id.
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water,” destroying muskrat habitat and traps.58 Many of the tracks carved by
these swamp buggies grew back with lush vegetation, but tracks used repeatedly
left lasting damage as “open water areas expanded, breaking up natural barriers
and leading to tidal scouring and increased water salinity.”59 These tracks,
canals, and pipelines “permanently altered the environment of southern
Louisiana, contributing to the increasing submergence and disappearance of vast
areas of marshland which greatly threatens the survival of Cajun communities
today.”60 The current ecosystem now “resembles a war zone with prime marsh
torn to rags, acres of no land at all, and a wide sweep of water spotted with
remnant strips of grass.”61
As Houck points out, the effects of these canals did not take decades to
accumulate, nor did it take years for people to begin raising the alarm.62 In 1925,
for example, Percy Viosca, an environmentalist who “held every important
wildlife post in Louisiana,” remarked that “[m]an-made modifications in
Louisiana wetlands, which are changing the conditions of existence from its very
foundations, are the result of flood protection, deforestation, deepening
channels[,] and the cutting of navigation and drainage canals.”63 He further
noted that the “[t]ime is ripe for an enormous development of the Louisiana
wetlands along new and intelligent lines.”64 Despite these cognizable damages,
wetlands merely stood in the way of oil companies, who eventually developed
“submersible drilling barges that could be pushed or towed to the site and new
floating draglines to clear the passage,”65 allowing development of oil fields that
would otherwise have been insulated from the high cost of exploration,
navigation, and development.
Canals quickly became a cheap way to circumvent the land itself. As
developers and regulators soon learned, however, this dredging came with a
hefty price: tens of thousands of acres lost to the tide, all in pursuit of profit.
C. Canals and Coastal Land Loss
What was once mere habitat destruction quickly turned into vast and
unparalleled geological and hydrological changes, fueled by drilling barges,
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Id. at 28.
Id. at 28–29.
Id. at 29.
Houck, supra note 23, at 195.
Id.
Id. at 198 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id.
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floating draglines, and greed. In 1955, “one Muskrat Line engineer wrote,
‘[w]hen comparing the marsh areas with aerial photos that we have, we find that
much of the terrain has changed and continues to change day-to-day,’”66
establishing that these effects were known decades before current controls on
canal dredging were implemented. Smaller canals dredged for exploration and
development quickly paved the way for “a galaxy of yet bigger canals to serve
industry tankers, barges, and crew boats,” which by and large have become the
most significant contributors to wetlands destruction.67 Whereas natural
channels in coastal wetlands are relatively shallow and discrete, typical
industrial canals are four to five meters deep and forty-one to forty-five meters
wide.68 These larger navigation canals “provide trunk access from which the
companies can cut to new sites and corridors,” allowing the penetration of
deeper “interior canals and ditches.”69
Though few would doubt that the dredging of navigation canals, specifically
for the oil and natural gas industry, has effectuated dramatic land loss, there is
dispute as to the extent of the loss directly caused by these canals.70 Even
commentators who most ardently advocate for the reevaluation of canal
maintenance practices, in light of their damage, understand that “wetland
hydrologic flows are complicated” and that “[h]ydrologic changes following
dredging . . . extend widely and perhaps unpredictably.”71 Part of this
unpredictability stems from the “extensive human-induced changes on this coast
66
67

Id. at 202–03 (quoting JASON P. THERIOT, AMERICAN ENERGY, IMPERILED COAST 47 (2014)).
Id. at 203. These larger canal projects drastically expedited the erosive processes:
[For example,] the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway, Calcasieu Ship Channel, Barataria Bay
Waterway, Houma Navigation Canal, Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet Canal (MR-GO), Lower
Atchafalaya River, and Bayous [Chêne], Boeuf, and Black Canals, and the list continues, with
yet more begging for authorization today, all largely justified on the transportation of oil, gas,
and petrochemicals, each channel deadly to the surrounding marsh. The ‘Atchafalaya River and
Bayou[s] [Chêne], Boeuf and Black, Louisiana’ project, built to favor two oil rig manufacturers
near Morgan City, sliced its way through 50 miles of the wetlands of Terrebonne Parish, the most
rapidly disappearing terrain in the state. The MR-GO, intended to speed travel for tankers of all
kinds, destroyed more than 30,000 acres of swamp forest below New Orleans and left the city
open to two devastating hurricanes, one month apart. None of that damage has been repaired. The
land is largely gone.

Id.
68
Eugene Turner, Discussion of: Olea, R.A. and Coleman, J.L., Jr., 2014. A Synoptic Examination of
Causes of Land Loss in Southern Louisiana as Related to the Exploitation of Subsurface Geologic Resources,
30 J. COASTAL RSCH. 1025, 1331 (2014).
69
Oliver A. Houck, Land Loss in Coastal Louisiana: Causes, Consequences, and Remedies, 58 TUL. L.
REV. 3, 50–51 (1983); see also id. at 46–48 (identifying navigation canal projects in the coastal zone).
70
Day et al., supra note 15, at 426.
71
R. E. Turner, Wetland Loss in the Northern Gulf of Mexico: Multiple Working Hypotheses, 20
ESTUARIES 1, 11 (1997).

NAQUIN_1.21.21

676

2/1/2021 12:20 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 70:663

[that] have apparently overwhelmed the causal linkages identified in a historical
reconstructionist view of deltaic gain and loss.”72 Perhaps more important than
the barrage of factors contributing to erosion, however, is the fact that “the vast
majority of spoil banks and canals are already constructed.”73 It is therefore
impossible to “determine precisely where wetland loss will and will not occur.”74
Prognoses for future land loss are inherently imprecise, but there is still a
wealth of research on the previous overarching effects of canals, including R.
Eugene Turner’s own conclusion that “[t]he indirect consequences of dredged
canals and the resulting spoil banks have led to the majority of land loss since
the 1930s”75 in Louisiana’s coastal Mississippi Delta. Studies vary widely, with
Turner stating that the direct effects of channelization “accounted for 12% of
total land loss” from the 1930s to 1990.76 He also notes that much of the
remaining wetland loss stems from indirect impacts of canals.77 Another
unpublished study puts the total figure of land lost in Louisiana by
channelization at 35%.78 Houck wrote that as much as 89% of all land lost in
Louisiana prior to 1983 was caused by industrial dredging.79
The extent of devastation serves as a useful—albeit imprecise—marker of
causation, and these studies nevertheless reveal a direct causal connection with
immeasurable indirect effects.80 In fact, for every hectare of canals dredged,
“2.85 h[ectares] of open water form . . . and an additional 1 h[ectare of] wetland
converted to spoil bank.”81 Even without this concrete data, there is a multitude
of facial assertions linking these industrial activities to land loss, such as
“massive deforestation of cypress forests, establishment of thousands of canals
for transportation and pipelines, development of oil and gas and a vast

72

Id.
Id. Turner also stated that “the additional area of dredged canals added in 1993 was less than 0.2% of
the total present in 1992.” Id.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 4, 8.
76
Turner, supra note 68.
77
Id.
78
S. Penland, I.A. Mendelssohn, L. Wayne & L.D. Britsch, Natural and Human Causes of Coastal Land
Loss in Louisiana, COASTAL STUDS. INST. & WETLAND BIOGEOCHEMISTRY INST. (1996) (unpublished report)
(on file with Louisiana State University: Baton Rouge).
79
Houck, supra note 23, at 205–06 nn.89–90.
80
See HEIDI BECK, ALICIA BIHLER, MELISSA KEMM, SAM PARDO & DOUGLAS PERRON, PHYSICAL AND
PROGRAM OPTIONS FOR THE INLAND MIGRATION OF LOUISIANA’S COASTAL WETLANDS IN RESPONSE TO
RELATIVE SEA LEVEL RISE, A REPORT FOR THE COASTAL PROTECTION AND RESTORATION AUTHORITY OF
LOUISIANA (2012).
81
Aaron S. Bass & R. Eugene Turner, Abstract, Relationships Between Salt Marsh Loss and Dredged
Canals in Three Louisiana Estuaries, 13 J. COASTAL RSCH. 895, 895 (1997).
73
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infrastructure to support it, and huge alterations in patterns of erosion and
sedimentation.”82
Notably, this direct correlation was known long before these late-twentieth
century scientific reports. As early as 1953, the Louisiana Department of
Wildlife and Fisheries’ “oyster and water bottoms chief” spoke on the issue of
canals: “When currents are changed by these canals and where dredgings [spoil
banks] are placed along the sides of the canal, in many cases currents are stopped
entirely or the flow lessened noticeably, . . . causing . . . changes in the ecology
of a given area.”83 In 1955, he said that “[e]cological and hydrographic changes
may be permanent . . . and may affect extensive areas ten miles or more on either
side of the canal.”84
Even oil industry insiders warned that the damage done by canals is more
extensive than what can be repaired in a controlled setting. A spokesperson for
Esso, the precursor to Exxon, stated in a trade journal published in the 1950s
that “[t]he land area [that] may be lost through soil erosion due to current through
flotation canals . . . cannot be repaired with a few passes of a bulldozer, some
shovel work, and a little seeding.”85 Furthermore, single canals, in and of
themselves, do not faze the coast as much as the web of canals culminating in
the mass production of “small lakes and bays.”86 By “provid[ing] passageways
for Gulf saltwater to enter delicate freshwater marshes,”87 these canals signal the
death of marsh plants whose roots no longer anchor the soil, thereby causing and
furthering erosion. This process allows canals to become pools, “pools [to]
become ponds,” and “ponds [to] become lakes.”88 Those lakes then become bays
practically indistinguishable from the Gulf of Mexico.89

82

AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 51, at 173.
Houck, supra note 23, at 207 (quoting THERIOT, supra note 66, at 54).
84
Id. at 208 (quoting THERIOT, supra note 66, at 58).
85
Id. at 209 (quoting THERIOT, supra note 66, at 82).
86
Id. at 210 (citation omitted).
87
Shinn, supra note 29, at 291.
88
Id.
89
Image of Interrelated Bays and Lakes, GOOGLE MAPS, https://maps.google.com (follow “Directions”
hyperlink; then search “Old Lady Lake Parish Governing Authority District 9”; click zoom out button to show
labels) (revealing an interrelation of several bays and lakes: (1) Bay la Peur, (2) Lake Barre, (3) Jacko Bay,
(4) Lake Felicity, (5) Old Lady Lake, (6) Terrebonne Bay, (7) Timbalier Bay, and (8) Lake Raccourci). Notably,
raccourci, the past participle of raccourcir, can mean “to have shortened” or “shortcut.” See Raccourcir,
DICTIONARY OF LOUISIANA FRENCH (Albert Valdman & Kevin James Rottet eds., 2010). For a discussion of
how erosion within this district affects commercial fishermen, see Collin Serigne, Shrimp Land, USA, YOUTUBE,
at 14:25 (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SiYT-IOWk6o&feature=youtu.be&fbclid=
IwAR3dkq2iScl3dXPprweK0z14c2TtBP5peCHD5ItyKz6q98-LqVWqc96AzQc.
83
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In the 1970s, speculation and suppositions gave way to the United States
Army Corps of Engineers (Corps)’s clear recognition that “[o]nshore pipeline
construction may cause irretrievable marshland loss.”90 Once the harm was
established and recognized, however, “attempts to at least soften the blow”91
came slowly. For example, the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries
recommended that companies plug “the ends [of canals] in order to arrest
saltwater intrusion,”92 but those plugs were short-lived and “presented no
obstacle to the incoming tide.”93 It was not until federal environmental
intervention took place in the 1970s that any relief came to floundering coastal
communities.94
Canals, then, have been given free rein to propagate and expand, shredding
Louisiana’s estuaries. As discussed below, current legal remedies are inadequate
to provide relief for coastal refugees.
D. The Limited Scope of Federal Coastal Regulation over Canal-Induced
Erosion
The advent of federal law, particularly the CWA section 404 permitting
program95 for deposits of dredged material and the Coastal Zone Management
Act of 1972,96 were the first moderately successful efforts to rein in the ecologyaltering effects of canal-induced coastal erosion. Congress enacted the CWA and
its progeny “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the Nation’s water”97 and to mitigate the disastrous effects of “the
wholesale degradation of the nation’s waters and the continuing failure of
federally-assisted state pollution control programs to remedy the problem.”98 It
is undisputed that “wetlands protection was critical to achieve national goals of
high water quality”99 pursuant to Congress’s stated purpose of the CWA.

90
Houck, supra note 23, at 209 (quoting U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT: CRUDE OIL AND NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION AND OTHER MINING OPERATIONS IN NAVIGABLE
WATERS ALONG THE LOUISIANA COAST 86 (1973)).
91
Id. at 232–33.
92
Id. at 233.
93
Id.
94
See infra Part II.C.
95
Clean Water Act § 404(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).
96
Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–64.
97
Clean Water Act § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
98
Oliver A. Houck & Michael Rolland, Federalism in Wetlands Regulation: A Consideration of
Delegation of Clean Water Act Section 404 and Related Programs to the States, 54 MD. L. REV. 1242, 1254
(1995).
99
Id. at 1246.
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In particular, section 404100 pertains to the regulation of fill discharges and
places a heightened level of importance on “steer[ing] wetland development
away from wetlands in the first place by the examination of alternatives. The
guidelines flatly prohibit the discharge of dredge or fill material in wetlands if
there is a practicable alternative that would have less impact on aquatic
ecosystems,”101 even going so far as to “presume the availability of alternative
locations for activities that do not depend on proximity to water.”102 However,
section 404’s protections of wetlands are limited in that they apply only to the
discharge of dredged or fill materials into navigable waters without a permit,103
not to the dredging itself. Even section 404’s mitigation requirements do not
address canal-induced erosion, instead focusing on wildlife preservation and
water integrity.104 Further, this coastal legislation did not effectuate its intended
benefits without significant opposition. Because the section 404 program was
“[a]dministered by the Corps, . . . which had been digging its own navigation
canals through the zone with enthusiasm, the section 404 program presented
little obstacle for decades to come, much of them marked by Corps resistance to
the new law.”105
The Coastal Zone Management Act, which required that activities “directly
affecting the coastal zone” be conducted “in a manner . . . consistent with
approved state management programs,”106 fared even worse. After the coastal
commission in Louisiana “had the audacity to actually reverse a state permit for
an oil access canal,”107 it was “quickly abolished and the process turned over to
the oil-and-gas-dominated [Department of Natural Resources], where it has
safely remained.”108
Thus, there is no statutory or regulatory provision that would prevent the
wholesale degradation of Louisiana’s coastal environment from canal-induced
land loss. As discussed below, litigation has proven even more futile, with
virtually no existing legal remedies.

100

Clean Water Act § 404(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).
Houck & Rolland, supra note 98, at 1255.
102
Id. at 1256 (emphasis added). But see infra notes 276–79, 300 (detailing the benignity of current impact
fees in the BTNE).
103
Clean Water Act § 404(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).
104
See infra Parts I.D, II.C.
105
Houck, supra note 23, at 233.
106
Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1456(c)(1).
107
Houck, supra note 23, at 235 (quoting Oliver A. Houck, Louisiana v. Lee and the Battle of Lake
Ponchartrain, 26 TUL. ENV’T L.J. 1, 13–16 (2012)).
108
Id.
101
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II. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF CANALS
The absence of sufficient state and federal regulation has imposed significant
burdens on Louisiana’s wetlands. This inadequacy in governmental protection
has also prompted significant civil litigation109 regarding the disastrous effects
of canal-induced erosion, as well as recent scholarship equating this sanctioned
erosion to a governmental taking.110 But far-flung academic papers and bigname cases do little to assist the common complainant, suffering through a sense
of malaise from a near total lack of remedies.
The residents of Isle de Jean Charles, from whom 98% of the land has been
taken by the tide,111 could arguably be seen as the lucky ones. After all, their
nearly $50 million-dollar block grant will afford them the opportunity to rebuild
not only their homes, but also a deracinated community—all on land twelve feet
above sea level.112 When many nearby coastal homes are already elevated on
stilts ten, fifteen, and even twenty feet high, protection from higher ground will
undoubtedly provide a physical and psychological safeguard that is not yet
available to individual complainants.113
For citizens to whom federal and state relief are not available, there is little
else to do but watch the tide slowly chip away at property lines, seemingly
erasing many property rights alongside them, for residents have inadequate legal
recourse and even less means to pursue that recourse. As discussed below,
tortious nuisance and contract disputes cannot provide relief for canal-induced
land loss claims, and even citizen suit provisions under the CWA have provided
virtually no relief for victims of coastal land loss.

109

See infra notes 218–20 and accompanying text.
See Ducote, supra note 28, at 201; see also Shinn, supra note 29, at 284.
111
Zanolli, supra note 28.
112
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
113
In one particularly tragic instance, paramedics responded to a call from Mark Naquin, Sr., one of the
Island’s oldest residents. After carrying Mr. Naquin down the twenty rickety steps of his elevated home, they
crossed a hand-made bridge above the bayou separating his home from the Island Road. While crossing the
bridge, it collapsed, sending the two paramedics, Mr. Naquin, and his wife, Oxcelia Naquin, into the inky
brackish water below. Telephone Interview with Taylor Naquin, Daughter-in-Law to Mark Naquin, Sr. (Oct. 10,
2019); see Naomi King, Local Cowboy Is a Legend in His Own Right, HOUMA TODAY (Dec. 11, 2006, 12:29
PM), https://www.houmatoday.com/article/DA/20061211/News/608099416/HC/; see also Danielle SeeWalker,
The Intimate Photo Project That Explores Contemporary Native American Life, AFAR (Feb. 2, 2019),
https://www.afar.com/magazine/the-intimate-photo-project-that-explores-contemporary-native-american-life.
110
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A. The Unavailability of Tortious Nuisance to Remedy Canal-Induced Erosion
Rooted in fundamental property rights, a nuisance is “any thing that worketh
hurt, inconvenience or damage . . . , [or any thing] done to the hurt or annoyance
of the lands, tenements or hereditaments of another.”114 Though it is another
property law maxim that “everyone has the right to use his property as he sees
fit,” that right must be balanced so as not to “unreasonably inconvenience a
neighbor in the reasonable enjoyment” of that neighbor’s property.115 These
property truths are no different in Louisiana, where “the owner of immovable
property, or a person deriving rights from the owner, generally has the right to
use the property as he or she pleases[;] [h]owever, the owner’s right may be
limited if the use causes damage to neighbors (and others).”116
These “obligations of neighborhood” place significant burdens on
establishing a nuisance claim when detriment to a plaintiff’s property is caused
by activities conducted by anyone other than those within a plaintiff’s legal
“neighborhood.” Unless a plaintiff can sufficiently allege that she is a
“neighbor” of the actor conducting the harm—“Louisiana courts have
interpreted ‘neighbor,’ as articulated in Article 667 [of Louisiana’s Civil Code],
to contemplate estates that are physically close to one another”117—the plaintiff
will not be able to establish that she has “some interest in an immovable near the
defendant-proprietor’s immovable.”118 In Barasich v. Columbia Gulf
Transmission Co., a group of plaintiffs sought damages from oil and gas
companies for causing erosion, thus rendering the area more prone to the
destructive impact of hurricanes.119 The district court noted that the “[p]laintiffs’
Article 667 claim fails because they do not demonstrate that the ‘neighbor’
referred to in Article 667 could be a party whose property is physically remote
from that of the defendants.”120

114
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *216; cf. Louise A. Halper, Untangling the Nuisance Knot,
26 B.C. ENV’T AFFS. L. REV. 89, 96 n.37 (1998) (“That definition is often used, but it is overbroad, for it could
include trespass, an invasive injury.”).
115
Devoke v. Yazoo & M. V. R. Co., 30 So. 2d 816, 819 (La. 1947); see also Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) (“[T]he question whether a particular thing is a nuisance[] is to be
determined . . . by considering it in connection with the circumstances and the locality. A nuisance may be
merely a right thing in the wrong place, like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard.”).
116
Bd. of Comm’rs of the Se. La. Flood Prot. Auth.—E. v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 615,
641 (E.D. La. 2015); see also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 667–69 (2019).
117
Bd. of Comm’rs of the Se. La. Flood Prot. Auth.—E., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 643.
118
Id. (quoting Roberts v. Cardinal Servs., Inc., 266 F.3d 368, 386 (5th Cir. 2001)) (finding that plaintiffs
injured on an offshore oil platform have no right of action under Article 667, which “clearly requires that activity
on the defendant’s premises must damage the neighbor or the neighboring ‘estate’”).
119
Barasich v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 467 F. Supp. 2d 676, 678 (E.D. La. 2006).
120
Id. at 690.
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Though claims of tortious nuisance are unavailable to potential non-adjacent
erosion-based tortious nuisance claimants due to an inability to establish this
“legal neighborhood,” some complainants have sought recourse through Article
2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code, which provides that “[e]very act whatever of
man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to
repair it.”121 In Barasich, the district court noted that “[l]iterally interpreted,
Article 2315 could hold a tortfeasor liable for any damage remotely caused by
his or her fault,” but “Louisiana courts have established limitations on the extent
of damages for which a tortfeasor can be held liable in the duty portion” of a
liability determination under Article 2315.122 Courts have thus found this burden
to remain quite high, and most plaintiffs will be unable to win on the merits.
Tortious nuisance can provide an equitable remedy in simple cases, but its
limitations are inadequate to settle the claims of an entire region of the Gulf of
Mexico floundering in the face of land loss. Tortious nuisance is therefore
unlikely to provide relief for the vast majority of potential land loss plaintiffs
because they “will be unable to establish that defendants owed them a duty or
that defendants’ conduct was a cause-in-fact of their injuries.”123 In Barasich,
the court stated that there was no “basis in Louisiana law to assert that defendants
owed a duty to protect [the plaintiffs] from damage caused by hurricanes,”124
but the court neglected to discuss duties not to cause the erosion that had initially
led to the stripping away of coastal lands, including barrier islands, which had
acted as a shield against gulf storms for centuries. Such a scope of care is
unforeseeable in Louisiana, where even mineral leases sought out by oil and
petroleum developers do not create a duty to restore adjacent wetlands lost to
that development.125
Even more problematic, however, is the second rung of the court’s analysis,
requiring proof that “defendants’ conduct was a cause-in-fact of [plaintiff’s]
injuries.”126 The erosion of coastal wetlands is the result of innumerable factors,
none of which can be taken in isolation.127 For example, it is possible and
foreseeable that one defendant’s canal could only have exacerbated the inflows
already in place from a yet-unknown defendant’s canal. Alternatively, this same
canal might hypothetically be carrying life-starving vegetation deposits from the

121
122
123
124
125
126
127

LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (2019).
Barasich, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 690–91.
Id. at 691.
Id.
See Terrebonne Par. Sch. Bd. v. Castex Energy, Inc., 893 So. 2d 789, 805–07 (La. 2005).
Barasich, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 691.
See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text.
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soil banks of yet a third canal. It is also conceivable that one canal,
hypothetically alleged to be the primary cause of erosion, is actually transferring
the inflows of a levee cut-out, thus bringing silt used for soil accretion instead
of the seeds of erosion. Even with expert hydrogeological testimony, it would
still be impossible to apportion damages because of myriad unknown canals and
unidentifiable defendants.
Causation is clearly the most difficult rung to overcome in a claim of tortious
nuisance against canal developers. Yet, it can logically be presumed that the
causation is still there. Even as early as 1955, the officials in the Louisiana
Department of Wildlife and Fisheries stated that “[e]cological and hydrographic
changes may be permanent . . . and may affect extensive areas ten miles or more
on either side of the canal.”128 More importantly, canals work not in isolation,
but as part of a system, culminating in the mass production of “small lakes and
bays.”129 If a canal, seen in isolation in 1955, could potentially affect the ecology
and hydrography of every aquatic area in a ten-mile radius, the damage
presumably associated with a network of canals is astonishing. For example,
paddling through the aptly named Wonder Lake, a relatively large body of water
adjacent to Isle de Jean Charles, one is not just left wondering what happened to
the cow pastures and rice fields that had once sustained nearby residents, but
also what happened to the canals themselves, as many of them have eroded into
oblivion.130
Though causation has been established with respect to the industry as a
whole, the inability to calculate damages caused by individual canals or
developers renders tortious nuisance ineffective. Even if a duty of care and
causation could be proven as to individual parties, a paltry collection of damages
would do little to stymie the ever-shifting tides and future devastation. As stated
in the doctrinal case on private nuisance, Pate v. City of Martin, “[s]eldom, if
ever, will an award of damages, standing alone, be an adequate remedy where
the nuisance gives every promise of continuing and is one that can be
corrected.”131 Whereas injunctions—in conjunction with damages—typically
serve to provide an adequate remedy for most nuisance claims,132 this type of
remedy might be ineffective in the context of coastal erosion, where the driving

128
Houck, supra note 69, at 24 (identifying navigation canal projects in the coastal zone) (internal
quotations omitted).
129
Houck, supra note 23, at 210 (citation omitted).
130
See supra note 89; infra notes 137–39, 280 and accompanying text.
131
Pate v. City of Martin, 614 S.W.2d 46, 48 (Tenn. 1981).
132
See generally Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219 (N.Y. 1970) (analyzing equity in terms of
balancing financial remedies with injunctive relief).
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factors have already been established. Not only is there already a 10,000-mile
network of industrial canals exacerbating land loss, but these canals are still
being dredged.133 What remains more viable than damages or injunctions is
remediation,134 which thus far has been largely limited to contract claims
between governmental entities and private developers.135
B. The Inadequacies of Remediation Through Contract
Even if tortious nuisance claims were available to potential land loss
claimants, damages do not necessarily effectuate remediation of the
environment. Under a theory of environmental remediation through contract,
monetary damages and the loss of property rights are not the plaintiff’s goal.136
Rather, parties hope to use contractual obligations to force a mitigation in
damages through affirmative action by the developer in maintaining an
ecological status quo. Despite this potential for wetlands remediation, several
legal decisions make clear that Louisiana courts are unwilling to provide
sufficient remedy through the law of contract.
In Terrebonne Parish School Board v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., the
Board filed suit against companies who owned gas pipelines constructed on
servitudes located on the Board’s land.137 These canals, however, drastically
widened, “exceed[ing their] permissible width by thirty feet” in 1957.138 This
failure to maintain the oilfield canals, the plaintiff argued, implicated an Article
2315 duty. Because “the servitude agreements here at issue d[id] not expressly
impose on [the defendants] the duty to prevent the canals from widening and
eroding adjoining marshland,” the contracts did not impose an implied duty to
backfill the canals or perform other remedial measures on the leased land.139
133
La. Oystermen Ass’n, Inc. v. Hilcorp Energy Co., No. 16-10171, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12216, at *1–
2 (E.D. La. 2017).
134
But see Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 101 N.E. 805, 805 (N.Y. 1913) (“Although the damage to
the plaintiff may be slight as compared with the defendant’s expense of abating the condition, that is not a good
reason for refusing an injunction. Neither courts of equity nor law can be guided by such a rule, for if followed
to its logical conclusion it would deprive the poor litigant of his little property by giving it to those already rich.
It is always to be remembered in such cases that denying the injunction puts the hardship on the party in whose
favor the legal right exists, instead of on the wrongdoer.”) (internal quotations omitted).
135
See Terrebonne Par. Sch. Bd. v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 290 F.3d 303, 307, 311 (5th Cir.
2002); Bd. of Comm’rs of the Se. La. Flood Prot. Auth.—E. v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 615, 618–
20, 625, 645 (E.D. La. 2015).
136
See State v. La. Land & Expl. Co., 110 So. 3d 1038, 1040–41 (La. 2013).
137
Terrebonne Par. Sch. Bd., 290 F.3d at 307–09.
138
Id. at 316.
139
Id. at 325; see also Terrebonne Par. Sch. Bd. v. Castex Energy, Inc., 893 So. 2d 789, 794 (La. 2005)
(holding that even under Louisiana state law, lessees causing erosion through channelization had no implied
duty “to restore the surface of the leased land to its pre-lease condition by backfilling the canals”).
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Similarly, in Board of Commissioners of the Southeast Louisiana Flood
Protection Authority—East v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., a state flood control
agency sought damages and injunctive relief based on industrial activities that
allegedly caused coastal erosion, thereby making the area significantly more
vulnerable to gulf storms and flooding.140 Specifically, the plaintiff wanted
responsible parties in the oil and natural gas industry to be charged with filling
in canals east of the Mississippi River alleged to have contributed to
environmental harm.141 The plaintiff’s theory was one based in contract,
whereby the plaintiff alleged to be a third-party beneficiary from the licenses
and permits issued to the oil companies by the Corps.142 Licenses and permits,
however, do not constitute contracts under Louisiana law, and the plaintiff was
unable to establish that it was a third-party beneficiary outside of the necessary
contract relationship.143 The plaintiff was therefore unable to find relief through
contract.
Though the aforementioned cases provide just a narrow sample of contractbased litigation, they nevertheless establish the incredible burden a plaintiff has
in establishing a contract claim based on canal erosion, even with powerful, bigname plaintiffs.144 This lack of success has prevented thirteen coastal parishes
from filing suit against the oil and natural gas industry for canal-induced
erosion.145 What recourse, then, is available to the average victim of land loss?
It clearly does not arise in tort or contract.

140

Bd. of Comm’rs of the Se. La. Flood Prot. Auth.—E., 88 F. Supp. 3d at 618–19.
Mark Schleifstein, Appeals Court Rules for Oil Firms, Against Levee Authority in Wetlands Damage
Suit, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Mar. 4, 2017, 12:51 AM), https://www.nola.com/news/environmental/article_deb7a37
a-091c-57e9-be50-a528fc5172ca.html.
142
Plaintiffs also asserted five other causes of action, including negligence, strict liability, natural
servitude of drain, public nuisance, and private nuisance. Bd. of Comm’rs of the Se. La. Flood Prot. Auth.—E.,
88 F. Supp. 3d at 618–19.
143
The court further noted that under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 313, “even if the permits
were construed as contracts, however, Plaintiff has not and cannot establish that it is an intended third-party
beneficiary under the terms of the permits.” Id. at 645 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 313
(AM. L. INST. 1981)).
144
See generally Terrebonne Par. Sch. Bd., 893 So. 2d 789; St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States, 887
F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
145
U.S. CHAMBER INST. LEGAL REFORM, LITIGATION VS. RESTORATION: ADDRESSING LOUISIANA’S
COASTAL LAND LOSS 8 (2019), http://instituteforlegalreform.org/uploads/pdfs/addressing-louisianas-coastalland-loss-report.pdf.
141
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C. The Inadequacies of Coastal Regulation in Mitigating Canal-Induced
Erosion
At both the federal and state level, the network of environmental legislation
and regulation146 has decelerated annual land loss, though not to the extent
necessary to provide meaningful relief for victims of land loss. Prior to
implementation of section 404 permitting through the CWA, Louisiana was
losing land at a rate of fifty square miles per year.147 By the mid-2010s, land loss
was reduced to between sixteen and twenty-five square miles per year.148 One
key to both this reduction in land loss and environmental remediation is
“mitigation,” a requirement under section 404 permitting.149
Mitigation takes a variety of forms, but these controls are often inadequate,
despite consistent clarification that mitigation is integral to the section 404
permitting scheme.150 In addition to mitigation by avoiding the proposed area
altogether,151 section 404 also requires minimizing152 impacts to an aquatic
resource and compensatory mitigation, which requires “replacing or providing
substitute aquatic resources for impacts that remain after avoidance and
minimization measures have been applied.”153 For compensatory mitigation, the
Environmental Protection Agency further states that it is best “achieved through

146
This Comment limits its exploration of regulatory litigation to the CWA. For a brief discussion of the
inefficacy of the Coastal Zone Management Act in Louisiana, however, see supra notes 106–08 and
accompanying text.
147
Adam Wernick, Louisiana’s Coastline Is Disappearing at the Rate of a Football Field an Hour, PUB.
RADIO INT’L (Sept. 23, 2014, 1:00 PM), https://www.pri.org/stories/2014-09-23/louisianas-coastlinedisappearing-rate-football-field-hour.
148
See id.; Donald D. Davis, Coastal Land Loss in Louisiana: From Denial to Reality, AM. ASS’N OF
GEOGRAPHERS (Jan. 1, 2018), http://news.aag.org/2018/01/coastal-land-loss-in-louisiana-from-denial-toreality/; supra note 6 (Supreme Court decision stating in 2006 that Louisiana was losing between twenty and
thirty square miles of land each year).
149
Clean Water Act § 404(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).
150
2015 Presidential Memorandum, Mitigating Impacts on Natural Resources From Development and
Encouraging Related Private Investment, https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-12/documents/
presidential_memo_regarding_mitigation_11-3-15.pdf (last visited Dec. 16, 2020).
151
See infra notes 101–02 and accompanying text. Generally, new developments must mitigate impact to
an aquatic resource by “selecting the least-damaging project type, spatial location and extent compatible with
achieving the purpose of the project. Avoidance is achieved through an analysis of appropriate and practicable
alternatives and a consideration of impact footprint.” Types of Mitigation Under CWA Section 404: Avoidance,
Minimization and Compensatory Mitigation, ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/cwa-404/typesmitigation-under-cwa-section-404-avoidance-minimization-and-compensatory-mitigation (last visited Dec. 16,
2020).
152
ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, supra note 151. The Environmental Protection Agency also writes that
“[m]inimization is achieved through the incorporation of appropriate and practicable design and risk avoidance
measures.” Id.
153
Id.
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appropriate and practicable restoration, establishment, enhancement, and/or
preservation of aquatic resource functions and services.”154 Mitigation can,
therefore, include “dedication . . . of easements over similar threatened lands, as
well as commitments to undertake projects for marsh improvement and
restoration, water diversion, beach nourishment, and similar measures.”155
With petroleum industry channelization, specifically, mitigation can take the
form of “alternative siting, use of existing canals, limitations upon canal and
board road lengths, increased use of directional drilling, plugging (and often
backfilling) of abandoned canals, restoration of sites upon abandonment, and
other requirements to ‘mitigate’ for adverse impacts.”156 However, a petroleum
corporation’s pledge to dedicate an acre of land to wildlife preservation in
exchange for a section 404 dredging permit does nothing to resolve the
complaints of a landowner whose shoreline is shrinking due to ecological and
hydrological shifts caused by those canals. After all, the CWA was largely a
response to the United States’ increasingly polluted waters157 with the express
goal of eliminating “the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters . . . by
1985.”158 It was not intended to remediate land loss from canal-induced erosion,
nor was it intended to account for complainants forced to relocate their homes
due to dramatic land loss.159
Further, section 404’s mitigation requirements might not even be applicable
to the actor dredging the channel because section 404 applies to the discharge of
dredged or fill materials,160 not necessarily to the channelization itself. In fact,
the D.C. Circuit has ruled that the act of dredging, by itself, does not even confer
jurisdiction on the Corps to regulate the dredging activity,161 regardless of “the
virtual certainty of fallback.”162 Though the Ninth Circuit has previously held
that creating minor fallback from metal prongs being “pulled across the wetlands
base, tearing up soil, including the protective clay layer”163 did confer such
jurisdiction, there is still not enough in the statute to provide real protection.164
154

Id.
Joseph E. LeBlanc, Jr., The Clean Water Act and Coastal Zone Considerations in Permitting Oil &
Gas Activities in Louisiana, 31 ANN. INST. MIN. L. 110, 121 (1984).
156
Id. at 111.
157
Julie Grant, How a Burning River Helped Create the Clean Water Act, ALLEGHENY FRONT (Apr. 21,
2017), https://www.alleghenyfront.org/how-a-burning-river-helped-create-the-clean-water-act/.
158
Clean Water Act § 101(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
159
See supra notes 33–36 and accompanying text.
160
Clean Water Act § 404(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).
161
Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1403–05 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
162
JONATHAN R. NASH, ESSENTIALS: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 90 (2010).
163
Id. at 91.
164
Borden Ranch P’ship v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 261 F.3d 810, 816–17 (9th Cir. 2001).
155
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Therefore, on a facial level, section 404’s protections do not extend to insulating
wetlands from the erosive effects of canal dredging, only to the health of the
water system from deposits of fill material.
The most direct recourse coming from the regulatory state for individual
complainants is the CWA’s citizen suit provision,165 with the express purpose of
“empowering private citizens to assist the federal or state governments in the
enforcement of the CWA.”166 However, land loss associated with dredging is
not a cause of action under the CWA, a limitation reflected in Louisiana
Oystermen Ass’n v. Hilcorp Energy Co. In Louisiana Oystermen, a fishing
association “accuse[d] Hilcorp of unpermitted dredging in the vicinity . . . of
Lake Grand Ecaille”167 via, inter alia, “propwashing, a process whereby the
large propeller blades of a tug are used to carve a channel through the
waterbottom.”168 Despite the alleged damage, however, the courts could offer
no recourse. Continuous or intermittent violations are actionable under the
CWA, but the Act does not confer subject matter jurisdiction to consider “citizen
suits for wholly past violations.”169
Louisiana Oystermen makes clear that the burden on potential plaintiffs and
requirements of citizen suit notices often act as a procedural preclusion to any
hope of remediation. However, there is a much larger problem: citizen suits only
apply to illegal pollutant emissions of dredged fill material, not to the thousands
of miles of canals dredged legally. Unpermitted dredgings presumably cause
more harm than legal dredgings, as illegal dredgings do not undergo any sort of
environmental impact assessment.170 Still, even heavily regulated dredgings can
suffer from an absence of oversight or fundamental misunderstandings in the
effects one canal may have on an estuarine system.171 Furthermore, the effects
of any canal would not necessarily be specific to the complainant who had

165

La. Oystermen Ass’n, Inc. v. Hilcorp Energy Co., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12216, at *4–5 (E.D. La.

2017).
166
Donald “D.J.” Stack, Jessica L. Day, Kate F. Marks & Tracy L. Starr, Follow the Yellow Brick Road:
Citizen’s Suits – Notice and Standing and Filing Oh My! 3 (Jan. 12–13, 2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with Stack & Associates, P.C.), https://www.stackenvirolaw.com/Publications/Land-Use-Conference-CWACitizen-Suit.pdf.
167
La. Oystermen, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12216, at *2.
168
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
169
Id. at *5 (quoting Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 64 (1987)).
170
See generally National Environmental Policy Act Review Process, ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.
epa.gov/nepa/national-environmental-policy-act-review-process#EIS (last visited Dec. 16, 2020) (explaining
the procedure for environmental impact statements under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)).
171
Further, NEPA charges the U.S. Department of the Interior Minerals Management Service “with
documenting the social and economic effects of the [oil and natural gas] industry.” AUSTIN ET AL., supra note
51, at 3.
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initiated the citizen suit, for “[e]cological and hydrographic changes may be
permanent . . . and may affect extensive areas ten miles or more on either side
of the canal.”172 It is foreseeable that the estuarine or canal system could have
other complainants miles away.173
Therefore, it is clear that a landowner suffering from canal-induced land loss
has virtually no existing remedy at law. First, the “neighborhood” requirements
of private nuisance prevent treating the petroleum industry as a tortfeasor for
non-adjacent canal-induced erosion. Second, relatively few entities affected by
channelization would have the type of contractual relationship required to assert
a claim in contract, as even those who would arguably be treated as third-party
beneficiaries in other jurisdictions cannot sustain a contract claim in Louisiana
courts. Third, citizen suit provisions are often a desperate last-minute attempt to
hold a party liable rather than an attempt to recover from past damages,174 as the
so-called “recourse” entails civil penalties owed to the federal treasury,175 not
civil damages that could potentially mend some of the effects of a tattered
personal shoreline.
Given the incredible burdens facing potential litigants, the solution might
require adopting the position not of the property scholar analyzing rights, but of
the layman struggling to explain what is going on around him: “This land was
taken. It didn’t just disappear. Someone took it.”176
III. TAKINGS
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states, “nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”177 Though this
clause is a “tacit recognition”178 of the government’s power to claim immense
tracts of land, it “‘was [also] designed to bar Government from forcing some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole.’”179
172

Houck, supra note 23, at 208 (quoting THERIOT, supra note 66, at 58).
See Houck, supra note 69, at 24 (“[T]he secondary effects of these canals, channels, pipelines, and their
associated work cause greater losses through erosion, intrusion, and subsidence than the original work itself.”).
174
Stack et. al., supra note 166, at 16.
175
See generally Elizabeth R. Thagard, Note, The Rule That Clean Water Act Civil Penalties Must Go to
the Treasury and How to Avoid It, 16 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 507 (1992).
176
Telephone Interview with Mark Naquin, Oyster Boat Captain and Owner, Mark’s Oyster & Seafood
Co. (Oct. 11, 2019).
177
U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also LA. CONST. art. I, § 4(B)(1) (2001) (setting forth Louisiana’s analogue
to the federal Takings Clause).
178
United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 241–42 (1946).
179
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1071 (1992) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364
173
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The prototypical example of Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence
involves the use of eminent domain, such as taking land for transportation
infrastructure. If the government constructs a railroad or highway that “cuts
through private land, the government owes the owners payment equal to fair
market value.”180 With eminent domain, the land “taken” is limited to that being
physically occupied,181 but takings also frequently occur during the construction
of public utility projects, such as “one of almost 700 dams the Army Corps of
Engineers operates, with a range of purposes that include supplying water and
providing recreation and hydropower in addition to controlling floods.”182 It is
in this context of water-based takings that residents of the BTNE, and arguably
other coastal communities, could find a modicum of relief. First, this Part
explores Fifth Amendment takings in the context of water coverage and water
damage. Next, this Part surveys contemporary cases and literature that could
shed light on takings claims in the context of canal-induced erosion within the
BTNE. Last, this Part addresses the myriad hurdles litigants would face in a
takings claim based on canal-induced erosion in the BTNE.
A. Overview of Fifth Amendment Takings Predicated upon Water Coverage
Where the invasion of water is permanent, a taking has occurred.183 In
Pumpelly v. Green Bay, the seminal case on whether invasion by water can
effectuate a taking, the Supreme Court held that a dam continuously flooding
the plaintiff’s land resulted in a taking.184 For a taking to occur in this context,
“[i]t is not required that property be formally taken . . . . Serious interference
with the common and necessary use of property, as by continuous flooding,”185
surpasses the burden requisite to establish a constitutional taking. When the
invasion of water is temporary, however, courts have been resistant to declare a
taking, for if “agencies that manage natural resources for the government had to
worry about liability for takings for every management decision, they would lose

U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
180
Editorial, When Flooding Is Not a Taking, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/
10/06/opinion/when-flooding-is-not-a-taking.html.
181
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 430 n.7 (1982).
182
Editorial, supra note 180.
183
Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166, 181 (1871) (holding “where real estate is actually invaded
by superinduced additions of water, . . . so as to effectually destroy or impair its usefulness, it is a taking, within
the meaning of the Constitution”).
184
Id.
185
ROBERT MELTZ, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 97–122, TAKINGS DECISIONS OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: A
CHRONOLOGY 20 (2015).
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the flexibility”186 needed to monitor those natural resources.187 More recently,
in Arkansas Game & Fish Commission v. United States, the Supreme Court held
that flooding can constitute a taking only if the flooding is permanent or
“intermittent but inevitably recurring,”188 based on factors such as “severity,
duration, character of parcel, and owner’s expectations regarding parcel’s
use.”189 If the courts in both Pumpelly and Arkansas Game & Fish Commission
each emphasized the permanence of the invasion as requisite criteria for a taking,
then it would seem logical to place canal-induced erosion in this same category,
for the stripping away of land that is not typically prone to such drastic erosion
cycles is the pinnacle of a permanent invasion.
Regardless of whether it was one square inch taken or one square mile,
erosion signals the permanent denial of every right in a property owner’s bundle
of sticks. In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., an apartment
owner argued that New York City’s permitting of a cable company to install a
half-inch cable running thirty feet across her roof and small directional taps
constituted a compensable taking.190 The Supreme Court held that “any
permanent physical occupation is a [per se] taking,”191 regardless of the size of
the parcel being occupied. It does not “matter how important the public interest
served or how minimal the economic impact.”192 Therefore, the space occupied
only speaks to the monetary amount required for “just compensation,” not to the
threshold issue of whether a taking has occurred.
Not only does Loretto suggest that the miniscule, seemingly infinitesimal
dregs of marshland being washed away would establish a compensable taking if
caused by government action, Loretto also loosens the distinction between
government and third-party actions that further the occupation of the space
allegedly being “taken.” Specifically, the Court had to wrestle with the fact that
it was a cable company—rather than a government agency—that had installed
the cable.193 Ultimately, the Court disagreed that “a similar invasion by a private
party should be treated differently” to a “physical invasion ‘by government,’”194

186

Editorial, supra note 180.
See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 30, 38 (2012) (holding that temporary
flooding from 1993–2000 did not effectuate a taking, despite $5.7 million in property damages).
188
Id. at 32 (quoting United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 328 (1917)).
189
MELTZ, supra note 185, at 4.
190
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421–22 (1982).
191
Id. at 432.
192
MELTZ, supra note 185, at 9.
193
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 432–33 n.9 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978)).
194
Id.
187
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stating instead that “[a] permanent physical occupation authorized by state law
is a taking without regard to whether the State, or instead a party authorized by
the State, is the occupant.”195 In the instance of canal-induced erosion, it is often
the third-party contractor, as opposed to the State, that has caused the land loss.
Further, Louisiana law provides that the “land that sinks beneath the Gulf or is
gobbled up by the Gulf, so that it is covered by water and can be interpreted as
being navigable, becomes the state’s property.”196 Such a permanent occupation
of that space by the government, in virtually any other circumstance, would
constitute a prima facie taking requiring a post-hoc claim of inverse
condemnation against the government.197
Whereas most takings in the context of land loss involve the government’s
purchase of lands to submerge or dredge,198 inverse condemnation claims
require extensive, “essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries”199 that are difficult to
predict with any precision. Despite ample support from Loretto, Pumpelly, and
Arkansas Game & Fish Commission in establishing that non-adjacent canalinduced erosion could constitute a compensable taking, causation remains a
problem under any inverse condemnation analysis.200
At a policy level, burdens suffered by landowners confronting canal-induced
land loss should be covered under the same rationale sustaining a takings claim,
for it was the government who permitted—either tacitly prior to the CWA, or
actively through section 404 permitting—the dredging of industrial navigation
and pipeline canals.201 Further, the Corps still plays an active part in the dredging
of canals for the exploration of oil and natural gas, in addition to providing
general support to the maritime petroleum and natural gas industry.202 This land
loss clearly falls under the takings rationale, which “‘bar[s the] Government
from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.’”203

195

Id. (emphasis added).
Shinn, supra note 29, at 284 (quoting CHRISTOPHER HALLOWELL, HOLDING BACK THE SEA 45 (2001)).
197
See supra note 191. For an argument supporting a claim of inverse condemnation for specific effects
of climate change, see Rosenberg, supra note 28.
198
See generally Tempel v. United States, 248 U.S. 121, 121–22, 131 (1918) (holding that the dredging
of a channel constituted a Fifth Amendment taking).
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Penn Cent. Transportation Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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See supra notes 70–93 and accompanying text.
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See supra Parts I.B, I.C, I.D.
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See infra notes 216–17 and accompanying text.
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Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1071 (1992) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364
U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
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Whether this land loss is the result of a taking turns on whether the dredging
is defined as “governmental”204 action and whether causation can be established
with any certainty. Though Loretto arguably supports the conclusion that the
tacit acceptance of unpermitted dredgings prior to enactment of the CWA would
have constituted a taking,205 such a claim would be precluded by more than forty
years due to the Tucker Act’s introduction of a six-year statute of limitations on
takings claims.206 However, recent decisions by the Federal Circuit have held
that a Corps-constructed jetty that prevented soil accretion—thereby resulting in
erosion—was compensable to the extent that causation could be proven. This
next section will first survey erosion-based takings claims in Louisiana before
discussing Federal Circuit claims addressing soil accretion.
B. Survey of Erosion-Based Takings Litigation
In the realm of civil litigation, there have been few erosion-based takings
cases and even fewer pertaining to canals. In Board of Commissioners of the
Southeast Louisiana Flood Protection Authority—East v. Tennessee Gas
Pipeline Co., the plaintiffs alleged that eighty-eight oil and gas companies
rendered Louisiana increasingly susceptible to tropical storm damage due to the
erosive effects of their industrial activities.207 Though their takings claim was
based on the flooding caused by erosive effects and not predicated upon the
erosion itself, this case nevertheless sheds light on some of the many limitations
facing takings claims, including the problem of jurisdiction.208
However, federal courts have taken up other types of takings claims linked
to canals. For example, in Avenal v. United States,209 130 oystermen “holding
oyster leases from the State of Louisiana sought compensation from the federal
government alleging that the freshwater diversion altered the salinity in the

204

Ducote, supra note 28, at 210.
See supra notes 193–94 and accompanying text.
206
28 U.S.C. § 2501 (“Every claim of which the United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction
shall be barred unless the petition thereon is filed within six years after such claim first accrues.”).
207
Bd. of Comm’rs of the Se. La. Flood Prot. Auth.—E. v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 615,
618–19 (E.D. La. 2015).
208
Ducote, supra note 28, at 202–09. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
evaluated whether it could hear a takings claim under several different theories of jurisdiction: (1) admiralty
jurisdiction, denied because “coastal erosion caused by dredges in navigable waters does not have a disruptive
effect on maritime commerce;” (2) federal enclave jurisdiction, denied because the harm did not take place at
the federal structures and enclaves in New Orleans, despite those enclaves being subject to increased flood risk;
(3) the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, denied because “Plaintiff’s injury would have occurred regardless of
operations on the [Outer Continental Shelf];” (4) the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, denied because the suit
did not meet the definition of a “mass action;” and (5) claims arising under federal law, denied. Id. at 206–08.
209
100 F.3d 933 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
205
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water over the leased oyster beds, rendering them unsuitable for oyster
cultivation.”210 The court rejected that the loss was a total diminution of value,211
instead treating the damages as a regulatory taking.212 However, the court held
that destruction of the oyster beds was not a compensable taking for two reasons:
(1) the plaintiffs’ investment-backed expectations were not reasonable;213 and
(2) the oyster leases were acquired after the government had planned and
announced its four diversion projects, including the flood diversion project that
had allegedly “taken” the oyster beds.214 Further, the oystermen had a more
serious problem precluding a takings claim: “[t]he [Avenal] plaintiffs retained
the use of their leaseholds; it was not the plaintiffs who were ousted by the
government project, but the oysters.”215 As Charles Shinn, an environmental law
professor, has suggested, the Fifth Circuit’s rejection of this takings claim might
no longer be viable today for two reasons: (1) Florida Rock Industries Inc. v.
United States216 established that “a categorical taking is akin to a physical taking
so that investment-backed expectations are not relevant”;217 and (2) Palazzola v.
Rhode Island218 established that “acquiring title after the event causing the
takings claim cannot ‘cure’ the uncompensated taking.”219 This modern takings
analysis opens the door for other theories arising under the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause for claims involving industrial canals.
More recently, in St. Bernard Parish Government v. United States,220 local
landowners alleged that state and federal government actors were liable for
damage to their real property caused by flooding from Hurricane Katrina and
other storms due to the government’s failure to properly maintain the canal
banks or otherwise modify the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet (MRGO), a canal
constructed and operated by the Corps.221 In the midst of Hurricane Katrina, “a
25-foot storm surge went directly up the MRGO, destroying the levees and
devastating St. Bernard Parish.”222 In spite of the damage and presumed
210

Shinn, supra note 29, at 279.
See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 (1992).
212
See generally Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978) (discussing the modern
regulatory takings doctrine when there is not a total diminution in value).
213
Avenal, 100 F.3d at 937.
214
Id. at 938.
215
Palm Beach Isles Assocs. v. United States, 231 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
216
18 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
217
Shinn, supra note 29, at 282.
218
533 U.S. 606 (2001).
219
Shinn, supra note 29, at 283.
220
887 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
221
Id. at 1357.
222
Thor Hearne, Stephen S. Davis & Ilya Shapiro, St. Bernard Parish v. United States, CATO INST. (Oct.
19, 2018), https://www.cato.org/publications/legal-briefs/st-bernard-parish-v-united-states.
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culpability of the government, the Fifth Circuit held against the plaintiffs for two
reasons: (1) allegations of government inaction could not be the basis of a
takings claim;223 and (2) “there was a failure of proof on the key issue of
causation” because plaintiffs had not considered “the impact of the risk-reducing
[Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project].”224 Though it is
clear that if the government floods private property, there is a Fifth Amendment
taking that requires just compensation, this case has “provid[ed] the government
with a convenient escape route by which it can avoid the constitutional
responsibility to compensate landowners for taking their property by not taking
reasonable steps to prevent damage.”225
However, the court’s rejection of any finding of causation might not be as
sound in fact as it is in law, for “as a general rule of thumb, every two to four
linear miles of coastal wetlands may reduce storm surge by a height of one
foot.”226 After all, it was the government that had initially constructed the
MRGO, thereby creating the vacuum for the twenty-five-foot storm surge that
wreaked so much havoc on St. Bernard Parish.227 This evidence
notwithstanding, the question remains open whether canal-induced erosion
caused by non-adjacent canals can effectuate a taking. One significant case
involving jetties in Michigan might shed light on whether artificial devices that
exacerbate ongoing erosive processes without directly causing the erosion can
trigger a Fifth Amendment taking.
In Banks v. United States (Banks II), the United States Court of Federal
Claims held that erosion allegedly caused by the construction of a jetty by the
Corps was compensable as a Fifth Amendment taking to the extent that the
plaintiffs could prove causation. Essentially, the plaintiffs had to prove that the

223

St. Bernard Par., 887 F.3d at 1361–62.
Id. at 1367–68.
225
Hearne et al., supra note 222.
226
Sandra Zellmer, Treading Water While Congress Ignores the Nation’s Environment, 88 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 2323, 2353 n.221 (2013).
227
Twenty years prior to St. Bernard Parish, in Simmons v. Board of Commissioners, the court did find a
taking when a dredged channel extension compromised a canal’s adjacent banks. 624 So. 2d 935, 951 (La. Ct.
App. 1993). Following the dredging of canals along the rear of plaintiffs’ parcels, “the canal banks, consisting
of wooded land, developed crevices and dropped off in large sections toward the water in the canal.” Id. at 938.
The banks had not completely stabilized, even at the time of trial eight years after the dredging began. Id. The
district court agreed with the trial court’s finding “that the land and trees actually lost when the canal banks
failed were ‘taken’ in the constitutional sense, and that the taking caused and will continue to cause severance
damages to the remaining property.” Id. In this case, causation was clear. These plaintiffs would likely have won
even under a theory of tortious nuisance, a remedy unavailable to potential complainants from land loss not
adjacent to a canal due to Louisiana’s “obligations of neighborhood.” See also Davis, supra note 29 (discussing
the separation of takings analyses and torts arising under the Federal Tort Claims Act).
224
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jetties constructed by the Corps caused the shoreline’s erosion because “any
further erosion caused by the protective structures is properly viewed as a
‘direct, natural, or probable result’ of the activities of the Corps in St. Joseph
Harbor.”228 Though the plaintiffs would still have the incredible burden of
proving causation, the Federal Circuit’s holding allowed the takings analysis to
proceed. Importantly, these complainants with lavish homes adjacent Lake
Michigan had significantly greater monetary damages than citizens of the
BTNE,229 further muddying whether this remedy is viable.
More recently, in Banks V, the plaintiffs sought the “value of all of the sand”
that had eroded, totaling $1,397,440.230 Though the court held that the plaintiffs
had offered “no legal support for the proposition that courts may award just
compensation on a permanent physical takings claim for the value of lost
resources,”231 it did briefly explore a theory of littoral rights that could have been
used by the plaintiffs. Essentially, the plaintiffs could have argued that they had
littoral landowners’ rights to accretions in the form of “naturally-forming
additions of land to property caused by sand, sediment, and deposit” and
relictions in the form of “land once covered by water that becomes dry when
water recedes.”232
Banks II and Banks V support the argument that erosion within the BTNE
and other estuarine communities caused by non-adjacent industrial canals could
be a Fifth Amendment taking to the extent that a complainant could establish
damage that was a “direct, natural, or probable result” of governmental action,
be it through the permitting of dredging activities, or by the Corps’s own
dredging activities. Though littoral rights to soil accretion would speak more to
the impact that the levee systems have on coastal land loss,233 the extensive
network of 10,000 miles of industrial canals shredding the gulf coast also
significantly affects accretion.234 After all, if there is no vegetation to trap it,
“nearly 90 million tons of sediment” flow from the Mississippi River,

228

Banks v. United States, 69 Fed. Cl. 206, 214 (Fed. Cl. 2006).
Banks v. United States, 721 F. App’x 928, 931 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
230
Id. at 943.
231
Id. See La. Oystermen Ass’n, Inc. v. Hilcorp Energy Co., No. 16-10171, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12216
(E.D. La. 2017).
232
Banks, 721 F. App’x at 943. But see Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot.,
560 U.S. 702, 708 (2010) (“Littoral owners have, in addition to the rights of the public, certain ‘special rights’
with regard to the water and the foreshore, . . . [including] the right of access to the water, the right to use the
water for certain purposes, the right to an unobstructed view of the water, and the right to receive accretions and
relictions to the littoral property.”).
233
See supra notes 20–25 and accompanying text.
234
See supra note 40.
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“bypass[ing] the marshes that desperately need it, including Barataria Bay and
Breton Sound,”235 with much of this sediment settling on the floor of the midto-outer continental shelf.236
C. Scholarship on Takings in the Context of Canal-Induced Land Loss
Though the takings doctrine has not garnered any significant remedies for
victims of canal-induced erosion in the world of civil litigation, there is a
growing body of legal scholarship speculating whether the government’s
culpability in the permitting of industrial canals can effectuate a taking.
In Of Coase, the Takings Clause, and the Inexorably Shrinking Marsh: A
Review with Lagniappe, Clinton W. Shinn muses whether “canals [are] the
cause, or merely facilitating factors”237 of massive coastal erosion. Arguing that
“demonizing”238 the oil and natural gas industry is too easy a solution for such a
complex problem, Shinn advocates for a more modest approach, privatizing the
canals so as to mitigate extensive future harm. But is privatization a viable
solution? After all, he, himself, admits that the oil industry has made itself “an
easy target”239 because of “the removal of oil and gas, water, and other
supportive sub-structures,”240 which he suggests is at least partially responsible
for “the whole coast . . . subsiding at an alarming and increasing rate.”241
Looking out from above, one sees nothing but a vast horizon of derelict valves,
“eroding pipelines[,] and canals.”242
Joseph Rosenberg, another environmental scholar, argues that the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause should play a much larger part in providing
remedies for coastal communities ravaged by land loss, in addition to other
drastic environmental disasters caused by rising sea levels and average surface

235
Wasted Sediment, RESTORE MISS. RIVER DELTA, http://mississippiriverdelta.org/our-coastal-crisis/
wasted-sediment/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2020).
236
Id.; Telephone Interview with Bryant Naquin, Oil & Natural Gas Producer (Nov. 22, 2019). Mr. Naquin
works for an oil and gas exploration and production company, where he is stationed at a production platform
near the Outer Continental Shelf off the Louisiana Gulf Coast. Periodically, he can see grasses reaching toward
the surface of the Gulf of Mexico from their bed of sediment carried from the Mississippi River—through the
canals, lakes, bays, and bayous—before settling on the floor of the Gulf. Ironically, his company had looked into
dredging away this new land because it poses an impediment to boats transporting oilfield workers to rigs and
other platforms. Id.
237
Shinn, supra note 29, at 291.
238
Id. at 290.
239
Id.
240
Id. at 292.
241
Id. at 291.
242
Houck, supra note 23, at 195.
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temperatures.243 More specifically, he argues that the federal government should
be liable for some natural catastrophes because of its own contributions to global
greenhouse gas emissions, as well as its specific affirmative duties regarding
protection against and “respon[se] to climate change effects.”244 Though
Rosenberg’s scholarship focuses specifically on climate change, a topic not
expansively explored in this Comment, he eloquently lays out a formula from
which a host of government action or inaction could result in a compensable
taking. Rosenberg offers three scenarios in which a taking should result from
situations in which “a particular federal entity knew or should have known that
its actions were inadequate, or that its inactions would result in significant risk
of harm,”245 the first of which can shed light on implications for canal-induced
erosion.
In this first hypothetical scenario, a complainant has built a coastal home,
“reasonably rel[ying] on Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)prepared flood maps and purchas[ing] the recommended flood insurance
through the FEMA-administered National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP).”246
FEMA, however, has often been negligent in updating its flood maps, especially
in light of the acceleration of sea level rise in the last ten years.247 With
rainstorms and high tides, the hypothetical complainant suffers from flooding,
establishing liability on the federal government because the following criteria
were met:
Plaintiff’s investment backed expectations were reasonable because
plaintiff relied on FEMA’s flood maps and NFIP program when
building. The federal government caused plaintiff’s harm because it
either knew or should have known—under 42 U.S.C. 4101(E), FEMA
is required to reassess its flood maps every five years—that its flood
maps were outdated and so posed a significant risk of serious harm.
Finally, plaintiff’s property here is arguably uninhabitable and,
inarguably, plaintiff’s reasonable and intended use of the land is
foreclosed because of the flooding by sea level rise.248

If uninhabitability can trigger a taking, so, too, should non-adjacent erosion.
After all, land loss stemming from industrial canals signals a much more
grievous harm than flooding: the total eradication of all property rights
associated with a given parcel of property. In Rosenberg’s scenario, the
243
244
245
246
247
248

Rosenberg, supra note 28, at 85.
Id. at 96.
Id.
Id. at 97.
Id. at 97–98, 127–28.
Id. at 97.
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landowner’s bundle of sticks remains somewhat intact, even if it is underwater.
With the loss of land, however, that bundle disappears entirely.249
Not all commentators would agree with Rosenberg’s suppositions. In one
student comment, Bud Davis stated that “arguments that the Government should
have done more or done something differently to protect property rights are
invalid in the takings context because their essence lies in tort.”250 In separating
tortious conduct actionable under the Federal Torts Claims Act,251 Davis relied
on originalist interpretations of the Takings Clause to argue that most postKatrina takings litigation would be barred because the Takings Clause requires
intentional government action.252 He further writes that “[t]here is no taking
under the [F]ifth [A]mendment unless there is an intent on the part of the
condemnor to take the condemnee’s property, or an intent to do an act the natural
consequence of which is to take the property.”253 What remains most crucial is
the identification of “some intentional, affirmative action taken in furtherance of
the public’s health, safety, and welfare in an increasingly populated world.”254
Though Davis’ argument would preclude post-Katrina litigation regarding storm
damage or flooding from the MRGO, it does little to dissuade arguments that
canal networks have caused the actual erosion. If permitting the dredging of
canals and physically dredging those canals are not “intentional, affirmative
action[s],” it would seem like nothing would be.
D. Problems with Takings Jurisprudence: Gradual Erosion and Inadequate
Remedies
Though recent precedent could support a Fifth Amendment takings claim for
instances of canal-induced erosion, these claims might become more trouble
than they are worth. The Tucker Act established a six-year statute of limitations
for takings claims, and a difficult question arises when that “taking [is]
occasioned by a gradual physical process,”255 such as erosion.
In Boling v. United States, the federal circuit held that a compensable taking
had occurred “when the banks of a government-created navigable canal eroded
through the effects of private vessel traffic wakes beyond the easement.”256
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256

See supra text accompanying note 195.
Davis, supra note 29, at 33.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1346.
See Davis, supra note 29, at 33–34.
Id. at 34 n.28.
Id. at 36.
Boling v. United States, 220 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Shinn, supra note 29, at 287 n.106.
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Previously, in United States v. Dickinson, the Supreme Court had held that a
flood was actionable when the factual situation had “stabilized” such that the
“consequences of the inundation have so manifested themselves that a final
account may be struck.”257 However, the Boling Court held that “requiring the
plaintiffs to sue immediately upon the initial encroachment of their land is too
rigid an application of the stabilization principle.”258 The Boling Court further
noted that “the touchstone for any stabilization analysis is determining when the
environmental damage has made such substantial inroads into the property that
the permanent nature of the taking is evident and the extent of the damage is
foreseeable.”259 Even though this stabilization analysis seems to strike a fairness
balance—that is, claimants are no longer “required to resort either to piecemeal
litigation or to premature litigation to ascertain the just compensation for what
is really taken”260—the Tucker Act would still preclude most takings claims
from canal-induced erosion.
For the bulk of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, Louisiana
landowners were told that it was hurricanes and nutria causing the rampant land
loss and that the levee system, constructed to protect citizens from tropical storm
flooding, was preventing perennial land accretion. With very few exceptions,261
canals were insulated from blame. Even if a landowner was aware that she was
losing land, it would not immediately be apparent that the damage was caused
not just by the adjacent bayou or channel, but by the interrelationship of canals
spanning the estuary,262 each picking up the inflows from the next in a network
of incredibly disastrous erosive processes.263
More importantly, expecting significant remedies from a takings claim
might prove futile here, as the damages would be based only on the value of the
missing shoreline, which is relatively little compared to the value of the property
as a whole or the cost of relocation. As the Supreme Court established in Loretto,
even a nominal payment of $1 paid prior to the taking can be just compensation
for a permanent physical invasion.264 Here, a few inches of land lost each year
would trigger equally paltry “just compensation”265 returns, thereby rendering

257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265

United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 749 (1947).
Boling, 220 F.3d at 1372.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Dickinson, 331 U.S. at 749.
See supra notes 75–83.
Shinn, supra note 29, at 294.
See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text.
Loretta v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 423–24 (1982).
Id. at 421.
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takings insufficient to confer just remedies, even if a takings suit were
successful.
As discussed below, the BTNE might require a legislative solution in the
form of revised impact fees, also called exactions. However, legislators must be
wary lest their conditional permitting also be deemed a regulatory taking, thus
negating the purpose of such a solution. Under the current exactions doctrine,
coastal communities could significantly further the policy behind coastal
development permits by conditioning such permits on contributions to a
relocation fund.
IV. “TAKING” IT BACK: USING EXACTIONS TO REMEDY CANAL-INDUCED
LAND LOSS
Thus far, this Comment has explored various potential remedies for litigants
suffering from canal-induced erosion and the myriad problems involving such
litigation. Furthermore, compensating a landowner for eroding shoreline does
nothing to mitigate future erosion, nor does it stop the threat of sea level rise
claiming these coastal communities during the ensuing legal battles.266 All
throughout the Terrebonne side of the BTNE, residents are floundering not only
to save physical markers of their culture,267 but also their homes and livelihoods.
Regarding coastal restoration and wetlands construction, wealthy sports entities
such as Ducks Unlimited have done their part to restore habitat for fish and
waterfowl, but this laudable restoration neglects the populations traditionally
dependent on that fish and waterfowl for survival.268 Even the Louisiana
University Marine Consortium, “built to be at the edge of the world” and
withstand winds of 250 miles per hour, might one day close its doors due to a
combination of erosion and rising seas.269 For many victims of land loss, such
as the Biloxi-Chitimacha-Choctaw tribe of Isle de Jean Charles, there is nothing

266
See John Schwartz, Marine Labs on the Water’s Edge Are Threatened by Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/07/climate/climate-change-marine-science.html.
267
King, supra note 31.
268
Resiliency Funding for Louisiana Restoration Work, DUCKS UNLIMITED, https://www.ducks.org/
conservation/sr/louisiana/resiliency-funding-for-louisiana-restoration-work (last visited Dec. 16, 2020).
Although Ducks Unlimited claims that its “marsh creation and nourishment with dredged material” will have a
great “benefit to human community resilience,” these projects benefit sports fishermen and hunters significantly
more than property owners. Interview with Keith Naquin, Oyster Boat Captain and Dock Manager, Mark’s
Oyster & Seafood Co. (Jan. 1, 2019).
269
Schwartz, supra note 266. For a visceral time loop of how LUMCON fared during Hurricane Zeta, see
Jesse Ferrell, LUMCON Webcam Loops from Hurricane Zeta, YOUTUBE (Oct. 31, 2020), https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=aoHfgoqoSi0.
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left to do but relocate from lower ground to higher ground. The only question
remaining is who is going to pay for the relocation.
First, this Part explores the current exactions doctrine, detailing the extent to
which municipalities can condition new developments without constituting a
Fifth Amendment taking against the developer. Next, this Part proposes an
impact fee-based relocation fund that would enable municipalities to offset the
migratory impact of new coastal developments without effectuating a Fifth
Amendment taking.
A. Constitutional Limitations on Land Use Conditions
It is axiomatic in the field of land use and property regulation that “new
developments create new burdens”270 on municipalities, often requiring land
developers to mitigate anticipated negative impacts of a development, otherwise
known as exactions. Exactions often take the form of impact fees, which are
mandatory fees set by a municipal ordinance to offset the expected negative
impacts of development by funding capital improvements needed to serve
growth, particularly additional burdens to infrastructure271 and utilities.272
However, land development can also be conditioned on such far-ranging
“mitigat[ions]” as the construction of bicycle paths,273 preservation of residential
occupancy limits,274 and, most relevant to the BTNE, wetlands remediation.275
Exactions, especially in the form of impact fees, are not novel to the BTNE.
Nevertheless, the current exactions scheme could be significantly amplified
against developers dredging these navigation and pipeline canals without
constituting a Fifth Amendment taking.
Located inside the BTNE, Terrebonne Parish Consolidated Government
(TPCG) is the legal body responsible for authorizing and regulating all new
coastal developments within its jurisdiction, of which 65% is wetlands or open

270
ROBERT MELTZ, DWIGHT H. MERRIAM & RICHARD M. FRANK, THE TAKINGS ISSUE: CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITS ON LAND USE CONTROL AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 241 (1999).
271
DUNCAN ASSOCS., NATIONAL IMPACT FEE SURVEY: 2015, at 1 (2015), http://impactfees.com/
publications%20pdf/2015_survey.pdf.
272
Jim Rossi & Christopher Serkin, Energy Exactions, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 643, 713 (2019) (proposing
an extension of current energy exactions practices to incorporate community values into energy planning).
273
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 397 (1994).
274
Seawall Assocs. v. City of N.Y., 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1059–62, 1071 (N.Y. 1989) (holding that the local
provisions on preventing single-room occupancy property owners from restoring and refurbishing existing
structures violate the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
275
Koontz v. St. John’s River Water Mgmt., 570 U.S. 595, 601–02, 605 (2013).
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water.276 In Article III of its Parish Code, which details land use regulations on
“Pipeline, Seismograph, Well Site, and Bulkhead Construction,” the TPCG
states that it “may place any reasonable conditions deemed necessary so as to
minimize or compensate for environmental impact.”277 Though the TPCG has
reserved for itself the right to take action to mitigate harm to the BTNE, the
default mechanism for controlling development is an impact fee-based coastal
permitting scheme that issues “coastal impact certificate[s].”278
It is not immediately apparent that these ordinances have been designed to
mitigate harm to the estuary since the TPCG Parish Code surprisingly treats
canals favorably compared to other industrial, nonresidential facilities. Whereas
commercial developments requiring a coastal zone permit from the Louisiana
Department of Natural Resources or a section 404 permit from the Corps are
subject to a sliding scale of fees ranging from $500 to $5,000 based upon the
value of the development in conjunction with the wetland and water bottom
acreage impacted, the certificate fee carries a flat rate of $500 for “the
construction of any well, well site, well platform, other mining operation,
pipeline, canal; or for the dredging of canals, bayous, borrow pits, wetlands,
lakes, bays, slips, shells or other excavation.”279 Though such a request would
still have to be authorized through a section 404 permit,280 the impact fee to
dredge a canal, lake, or bay is a mere $500, despite concerns dating back to the
1950s that “[e]cological and hydrographic changes may be permanent . . . and
may affect extensive areas ten miles or more on either side of the canal.”281
Further, the canals themselves cause immediate adjacent erosion, often resulting
in lakes and bays bearing the same name as the canal.282 Ironically, these coastal
impact certificates make up Terrebonne Parish’s Coastal Restoration and
Preservation Fund, designed to encourage multiple uses and synergize
development with restoration.283 How can such synergy exist when these

276
Bayou Country: Houma & Terrebonne, HOUMA TRAVEL, https://houmatravel.com/about/bayoucountry (last visited Dec. 16, 2020).
277
TERREBONNE PARISH, LA. CODE OF ORDINANCES § 12-74 (2019) (detailing coastal impact fees on new
developments) (emphasis added).
278
Id. § 12-73.
279
Id.
280
See supra notes 97–100, 149 and accompanying text.
281
Houck, supra note 23, at 208 (citations omitted).
282
Image of Bush Canal and Resulting Bush Lake, GOOGLE MAPS, https://maps.google.com (follow
“Directions” hyperlink; then search “Bush Canal, Parish Governing Authority District 9, LA”).
283
The TPCG described the fund in its 2017 accounting budget:

[The Coastal Restoration and Preservation Fund’s] mission is to provide aggressive leadership,
direction, and consonance in the development and implementation of policies, plans and
programs which encourage multiple uses of the coastal zone and achieve a proper balance
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navigation and pipeline canals actively destroy virtually all other non-industrial
uses?
In light of the land already lost from an overdeveloped estuary, “the removal
of oil and gas, water, and other supportive sub-structures”284 furthering
subsidence, and a canal network expediting erosive processes, one would expect
the only “reasonable condition[]”285 imposed by the TPCG to be a permanent
injunction against the dredging activities themselves. However, few legislators,
if any, would risk enjoining activities that have served as the economic bedrock
of their constituency for close to a century.286 Arguably, such an economic
collapse might be worse for the culture of these coastal communities than the
land loss threatening their homes.287 Further, a permanent injunction depriving
the would-be developer of beneficial use of his property might also give rise to
liability on the TPCG, for “if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking.”288 As conditions levied on the development “expand beyond the
geographic boundaries of a plat or constitute a public benefit not related to a

between development and conservation, restoration, creation and enhancement of Coastal
Resources in Terrebonne Parish for the enjoyment and long-term benefit of our residents
consistent with the State Comprehensive Plan for Coastal Restoration.
Terrebonne Parish, Adopted Budget 71, 99 (2017) https://www.tpcg.org/files/accounting/budget_2017.pdf.
284
Shinn, supra note 29, at 292.
285
TERREBONNE PARISH, LA. CODE OF ORDINANCES § 12-74 (2019).
286
Houck, supra note 23, at 206 n.91 (citation omitted). Houck paints a dismal picture of reliance on the
oil industry:
We had little choice but to base our economy on the oil industry. After all, prior to that Terrebonne
Parish was an agricultural community with a very productive fishing industry. Oil was good to
us, but now we are left with the residue and devastation of our wetlands. Subsidence, erosion,
useless canals by the hundreds, toxic waste, and whatever else we inherited when our area was,
for all practical purposes, abandoned and left to deteriorate even further.
Id.
287
For an exploration of how relocation might affect coastal communities within Southeast Louisiana,
including immigrant populations who have already gone through their own diaspora, see Nicole P. Lirette,
Capturing the Dissolving Native Story: Saving Louisiana’s Historic Coastal Settlements Through Community
Relocation with Cultural Documentation 81, 120 (2017) (M.P.S. Thesis, Tulane University) (available at
https://digitallibrary.tulane.edu/islandora/object/tulane%3A94324/datastream/PDF/view).
288
Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922); see Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1029–30 (1992) (providing that unless the owner’s proposed use of the property is one already prohibited by
state law principles of property or nuisance, any regulation depriving owner of all beneficial use of his or her
property is a taking requiring just compensation). However, the TPCG could potentially escape takings liability
through its local zoning authority by “phas[ing] out nonconforming uses [dredging] with amortization provisions
that require the owner to discontinue the nonconforming use after a certain period of time.” Bd. of Zoning
Appeals v. Leisz, 702 N.E.2d 1026, 1032 (Ind. 1998); see also Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz,
Grandfathering and Environmental Regulation: The Law and Economics of New Source Review, 101 NW. U. L.
REV. 1677, 1731 nn. 268–70 (2007) (discussing the amortization of non-conforming uses to avoid takings
liability).
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plat-created harm, they become exactions subject to invalidation or a
requirement to pay just compensation.”289 Therefore, any municipality imposing
a condition should be wary, lest the developer realize a benefit from his proposed
development, regardless of that development’s potential harm. Not only would
such a takings claim add insult to injury, it would fundamentally stifle efforts by
the TPCG to mitigate harm to its waters and the BTNE as a whole.
The TPCG could also condition the permits upon a certain amount (in
acreage or dollars) of wetlands remediation. However, if the dredging is
ongoing, these “attempts to . . . soften the blow”290 might still not be enough.
Remedial measures such as plugging “the ends [of canals] in order to arrest
saltwater intrusion”291 are short-lived solutions that “present[] no obstacle to the
incoming tide.”292 More drastic measures such as artificially creating wetlands
would dramatically arrest saltwater inflows, but without sediment replenishing
the land,293 new wetlands would be prone to similar levels of coastal intrusion
as those caused by canals in the original wetlands.
Be it an injunction against dredging, mandatory canal-plugging, or wetlands
remediation, each of these options—readily available to the TPCG—is subject
to the one resource that is most limited: time. Such remedial projects would not
likely be realized in the lifetime of those currently suffering from land loss,
making many of these remedies more beneficial to the environment than citizens
suffering within that environment.294 Wetlands remediation is a laudable goal,
but property rights were taken from humans, not land, and rising sea levels
indicate that any restorative measures implemented today will likely be claimed
by the Gulf of Mexico tomorrow,295 leaving landowners with no available
remedies. Rampant land loss, “rising waters[,] and escalating flood insurance
rates will drive thousands of families farther inland”296 from “the rich, still
bayous” of these communities’ ancestors. For many, relocation will be the only
true remedy.297
289

MELTZ ET AL., supra note 270, at 240.
Houck, supra note 23, at 233.
291
Id. (internal footnote omitted).
292
Id.
293
See supra notes 12–16 and accompanying text.
294
Nathaniel Rich, Destroying a Way of Life to Save Louisiana, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2020), http://www.
nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/21/magazine/louisiana-coast-engineering.html.
295
Schwartz, supra note 265.
296
Annie Snider, Letter from Louisiana: ‘It’s Not Going to Be All Right’, POLITICO (Sept. 1, 2017),
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/09/01/harvey-texas-louisiana-floods-relocation-215565.
297
Many of these refugees will settle in Houma, the industrial base of the BTNE. That population increase
“could more easily win additional levees and flood protection” for manufacturers supplying nearby oil and
natural gas companies, the same actors responsible for the need for relocation. Id.
290
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Given current projections for rising sea levels, it is therefore imperative that
the oil and natural gas industry be held accountable for their ongoing dredging
activities contributing to land loss before the Gulf of Mexico covers not only the
remaining wetlands within the estuary, but also the evidence proving that it was
canal dredging (in addition to natural resource exploration and extraction) that
jumpstarted the erosive processes that initially made the BTNE more susceptible
to the rising sea levels. These communities might very well disappear before any
remedy takes effect, essentially allowing the oil and natural gas industry to
escape liability for almost a century of profits at the cost of thousands of square
miles of Louisiana’s greatest natural resource: its delta.298
B. The Constitutionality of an Impact Fee-Based Relocation Fund
For untold thousands of residents in coastal communities, including those
within the BTNE, the only way to alter the human devastation from land loss
and rising seas is relocation. However, relocation, especially at a large-scale
level, is incredibly expensive,299 and deracination comes with its own intangible
costs: the loss of culture and community.300 In a grim article titled ‘It’s Not
Going to Be All Right’, Annie Snider recently labeled coastal relocation as
“toxic . . . . [It is] disruptive and interventionist, the kind of move that foments
revolutions.”301 Despite Louisiana’s “massive battle against the rising tide,
[including] planning and funding ambitious efforts to restore buffering wetlands
and build levees and floodgates,” the State acknowledges that “even [its] best
efforts will not be enough.”302 When it becomes clear that the land will not be
restored, what comes next?
One solution to solve both the problem of relocating victims of land loss and
holding responsible parties accountable is altering the current system of impact
fees to account for relocation. The TPCG—or other coastal governments
struggling to address both land loss and climate change—could issue dredging
or other development permits that are contingent upon paying into a relocation
fund for anyone affected by land loss within the estuary of the development,
such that individual complainants (or communities) similar to Isle de Jean
Charles could conceivably relocate without federal block grants.

298
299
300
301
302

See supra note 49.
See supra notes 17, 287 and accompanying text.
See supra note 287.
Snider, supra note 296.
Id.

NAQUIN_1.21.21

2021]

2/1/2021 12:20 PM

INADEQUATE REMEDIES FOR EROSION

707

The current default impact fee for the dredging of canals within the
jurisdiction of the TPCG carries with it a presumption of benignity and casts
doubt on whether the TPCG’s notice of potential future exactions is merely an
idle threat. Even if canal-induced erosion is not a legal tortious nuisance, it is an
actual nuisance with all indicia of permanence, suggesting that a single, onetime impact fee paid to the local government will always be an inadequate
remedy.303 Further, impact fees were never intended to supplant a claim of
nuisance or act as a penalty; rather, they are intended to provide a mechanism
by which the state may attempt to remediate issues caused by a future
development. Given the impending mass exodus of coastal communities caused,
at least in part, by the dredging of canals, it is ostensible that these developments
will lead to future urban growth in other communities.304
A relocation fund would then act in precisely the same manner as more
conventional impact fees purposed for future urban growth, with two
insignificant distinctions. The first distinction is that this relocation fund, in
addition to fueling more conventional utility and transportation infrastructure for
the expected future growth, would benefit individuals more directly. Traditional
impact fees benefit the entire community by advancing public projects involving
transportation or utilities.305 Here, such a relocation fund would also go toward
individual plots of land that coastal land loss refugees could then develop. The
second distinction is that this proposed fund would also function as an adequate
remedy for those who could not undergo the extensive causation burdens of a
takings claim,306 and for whom tortious nuisance, contract law, and the
regulatory state can provide no relief.
With such a fund, even if the land loss prompting the relocation was not
caused by the specific canal subject to the exaction, it would not trigger a Fifth
Amendment taking under the current exactions doctrine, as reflected in Nollan
v. California Coastal Commission,307 Dolan v. City of Tigard,308 and Koontz v.
St. Johns River Water Management District.309

303
Pate v. City of Martin, 614 S.W.2d 46, 48 (Tenn. 1981) (“Seldom, if ever, will an award of damages,
standing alone, be an adequate remedy where the nuisance gives every promise of continuing and is one that can
be corrected.”). Although Pate pertained to an award of monetary damages for tortious nuisance, the rationale
behind injunctions for a permanent nuisance is correlative with damages caused by industrial canals.
304
Snider, supra note 293.
305
Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Changing Culture of American Land Use Regulation: Paying for Growth
with Impact Fees, S.M.U. L. REV. 177, 245–46 (2006).
306
See supra notes 70–93 and accompanying text.
307
483 U.S. 825, 836–37 (1987).
308
512 U.S. 374, 384, 387–88, 394–95 (1994).
309
570 U.S. 595, 616–17, 619 (2013). In Koontz, the Supreme Court held that the exactions analysis
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In Nollan, landowners attempted to invalidate a condition set by the
California Coastal Commission granting to the public an easement across their
beachfront property.310 For any land use condition to be valid, however, it must
“further the end advanced as the justification for the prohibition.”311 Though
conditions serving legitimate police-power purposes are not takings,312 this
“evident constitutional propriety disappears . . . if the condition substituted for
the prohibition utterly fails to further the end advanced as the justification for
the prohibition.”313 Therefore, there must be an “essential nexus” between the
conditional permit and the purpose behind the conditional permit.314 This
proposed system of an impact fee-based relocation fund would overcome the
“essential nexus” test of Nollan. Because dredging activities are the predominant
cause of coastal land loss, thereby rendering residents more susceptible to rising
sea levels and tropical superstorms, it is clear that funding relocation would bear
an “essential nexus” to elevating impact fees for relocation contributions.
In crafting this type of impact fee scheme, municipalities would still have to
prove “rough proportionality” under Dolan. In Dolan, which lays out the second
step in the Supreme Court’s exactions analysis, the City of Tigard conditioned a
redevelopment permit on a pedestrian and bicycle pathway easement and
dedication of a floodplain to offset the predicted flooding impacts of a larger
retail store.315 After evaluating whether there was an “essential nexus” under
Nollan, the Court adopted the “reasonable relationship” test from a majority of
state courts, requiring “rough proportionality”316 “between the required
dedication and the impact of the proposed development.”317 Because
“[e]cological and hydrographic changes may be permanent . . . and may affect
extensive areas ten miles or more on either side of the canal,” it is also clear that
the permitting of any single canal will have permanent adverse effects on the
nearby environment. What remains problematic is that “hydrologic changes
following dredging . . . extend widely and perhaps unpredictably.”318
adopted in Nollan and Dolan also applies to monetary exactions, including dedications and impact fees. Id. at
612, 616.
310
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827.
311
Id. at 837.
312
Id. at 836 (contrasting by analogy that conditions attached to prohibitions that fail to further legitimate
state interests are not takings).
313
Id. at 837.
314
Id. Here, the coastal commission’s condition did not advance its rationale, which included lowering
psychological barriers and protecting visual access to the beach, thereby rendering the condition invalid. Id. at
837–39.
315
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 377–78, 388 (1994).
316
Id. at 391.
317
Id. at 390.
318
Turner, supra note 71, at 11.
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However, unpredictability, by itself, is not enough to defeat a claim of
“rough proportionality.” A regulating entity imposing land use conditions is not
required to prove that the expected negative impacts will actually occur. All that
is necessary for use of the police power to be justified here is that the entity or
municipality rely on credible, legitimate studies in making their findings.
Though the effects of channelization are wide and unpredictable,319 there is
ample support for a linear connection between the area initially dredged and the
area of land lost because of that channelization—as much as 2.85 hectares of
land lost for each hectare of land dredged, not counting the additional hectare of
spoil banks causing other erosive effects. 320 Given the wealth of research linking
the dredging of canals to land loss,321 it can be presumed that such an impact fee
would be “an appropriate exercise of the police power” and not an arbitrary
“excuse for taking property simply because at that particular moment the
landowner is asking the city for some license or permit.”322
Therefore, conditioning coastal developments on paying into a relocation
fund would be a legitimate use of the locality’s police power and survive a
takings claim by developers. Such a program would enable municipalities to
compel developers of canals to provide an equitable remedy for those suffering
from land loss.
CONCLUSION
It is clear that within the BTNE and other coastal communities, property
rights have been and continue to be taken—both physically and constitutionally.
There is a harrowing lack of remedies available for victims of coastal land loss,
despite arguably viable claims of tortious nuisance and theories of third-party
beneficiaries in contract suits. Regulatory protections and citizen suits have
proven equally futile. Though recent case law involving erosion323 and scientific
studies involving canals324 could support a takings claim for residents within the
BTNE, this remedy would be inadequate and the causation incalculable.325 Most
importantly, however, is the fact that compensating a landowner for eroding
shoreline does nothing to mitigate future erosion or the threat that sea level rise
319
320
321
322

Id.
See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text.
Houck, supra note 23, at 205–06 nn.89–90; supra note 49 and accompanying text.
Dolan, 512 U.S. at 390 (quoting Simpson v. City of North Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297, 319–20 (Neb.

1980)).
323

See supra notes 227–31 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 23, 49 and accompanying text.
325
The Tucker Act also precludes most potential takings claims stemming from canal-induced erosion,
despite current jurisprudence on “stabilization.” See supra notes 254–59 and accompanying text.
324
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might claim these coastal communities even before their land erodes into
oblivion.326
It is therefore imperative that coastal communities, particularly the BTNE,
adopt new regulatory schemes to offset the human impacts from navigation and
pipeline canals: the loss of community, culture, and the land that sustains each.
Under the current exactions doctrine, coastal communities can—and should—
implement an impact fee-based relocation fund to assist those prone to land loss
in relocating to higher, firmer ground. Such a program would compel those
responsible for the majority of this land loss—oil and natural gas companies
operating a network of 10,000 miles of navigation and pipeline canals—to pay
for the relocation of individual complainants or communities similar to Isle de
Jean Charles.
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